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Abstract
This thesis presents two essays in Corporate Finance. In the first essay, I use the
August 2007 crisis episode to gauge the effect of financial contracting on real firm
behavior. I identify heterogeneity in financial contracting at the onset of the cri-
sis by exploiting ex-ante variation in long-term debt maturity structure. Using
a difference-in-differences matching estimator approach, I find that firms whose
long-term debt was largely maturing right after the third quarter of 2007 cut their
investment-to-capital ratio by 2.5 percentage points more (on a quarterly basis)
than otherwise similar firms whose debt was scheduled to mature after 2008. This
drop in investment is statistically and economically significant, representing one-
third of pre-crisis investment levels. A number of falsification and placebo tests sug-
gest that my inferences are not confounded with other factors. For example, in the
absence of a credit contraction, the maturity composition of long-term debt has
no effect on investment. Moreover, long-term debt maturity composition had no
impact on investment during the crisis for firms for which long-term debt was not
a major source of funding. Our analysis highlights the importance of debt matu-
rity for corporate financial policy. More than showing a general association between
credit markets and real activity, my analysis shows how the credit channel operates
through a specific feature of financial contracting.
In the second essay, I analyze how institutional investors choose which Initial
Public Offering to invest. Using a sample of IPOs from 1980 to 2004, I show that
the reputation of the lead underwriter is the most significant variable in this deci-
sion process. Using Carter-Manaster rankings of underwriter reputation, I report
that a one point increase in the reputation ranking leads to a 2% increase in insti-
tutional investors‘ holding. Moreover, I test hypotheses about what kind of certifi-
cation the underwriter is providing. I provide evidence that underwriters certify un-
measurable characteristics, in contrast to measurable characteristics, such as those
provided in the financial statements of the issuer.
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Chapter 1
Corporate Debt Maturity and the
Real Effects of the 2007 Credit
Crisis 1
1.1 Introduction
Does financial contracting have real implications? How do firms respond to credit
shortages? In this paper, we design a strategy to pin down the effect of financial
contracting on real corporate outcomes following a credit shock. We do so using the
crisis (or “panic”) of August 2007. Gorton (2008) provides a detailed analysis of
the various forces leading to the sharp reduction in liquidity that affected financial
institutions dealing with subprime-based derivatives starting in late-2007. The lack
of transparency in long-term investments of financial institutions and the possibil-
ity that losses on credit derivatives would be passed onto their balance sheets led
to a panic that shut down financing to banks and non-banking institutions (see also
Acharya et al. (2009)). As we document below, the crisis spilled over onto the mar-
ket for long-term corporate debt in the fall of 2007, making it difficult for firms to
rollover their long-term obligations.
The 2007 episode provides for an unexpected shock to the availability of credit.
But the shock per se does not guarantee one can establish a clear link between fi-
nancial contracting and real-side outcomes. In particular, while general credit con-
ditions may exacerbate the correlation between variables such as financial leverage
and corporate investment, one cannot pin down a causal effect. To establish that
effect, one needs to identity a feature of financial contracting whose variation can
be considered to be pre-determined at the time of the credit shock. This feature
of contracting must be relevant for overall firm financing, commonly observed, and
relatively rigid (hard to recontract around).
We identify heterogeneity in financial contracting at the onset of the 2007 panic
by exploiting ex-ante variation in firms’ long-term debt maturity structures. We ex-
amine whether firms with large fractions of their long-term debt maturing at the
time of the crisis have to adjust their behavior (e.g., cut capital expenditures) in
1This chapter is related to the working paper “Corporate Debt Maturity and the Real Effects
of the 2007 Credit Crisis,” with Heitor Almeida, Murillo Campello and Scott Weisbenner.
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ways that are more pronounced than otherwise similar firms that need not refinance
their long-term debt at that time. To the extent that these refinancing effects are
large, they imply that the terms of financial contracting — contract maturity —
affect real-side corporate outcomes.
Let us discuss how our focus on long-term debt maturity works as an identifi-
cation tool. Prior corporate finance literature has shown that the choice between
short- versus long-term debt is correlated with firm characteristics such as size,
profitability, and credit ratings (see Barclay and Smith (1995) and Guedes and
Opler (1996)). As such, in general, the use of debt maturity creates difficulties for
the identification of unconfounded causal effects of financial contracting on real out-
comes. At the same time, long-term debt is typically publicly-held and difficult to
renegotiate on short notice (Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)). Because cumulative,
hard-to-reverse decisions made several years in the past affect current long-term
debt maturity structures, it is hard to argue that firms are at their “optimal debt
maturities” at all times.2 Accordingly, whether a firm had to refinance a signifi-
cant portion of its long-term debt right after August 2007 is plausibly exogenous to
the firm’s performance in the aftermath of the shock. We exploit this wrinkle — a
maturity-structure discontinuity — in our analysis. Simply put, we use the propor-
tion of long-term debt that is long pre-scheduled to mature right after fall of 2007
to gauge how firms’ real decisions are affected by financing constraints.
While our analysis treats variation in the fraction of long-term debt that comes
due right after August 2007 as exogenous to firm outcomes, one might wonder if
other sources of firm heterogeneity could underlie the relations we observe. To alle-
viate this concern, we use a difference-in-differences matching estimation approach
that incorporates observable firm characteristics and accounts for unobservable, id-
iosyncratic firm effects. We design our tests so that firm refinancing status can be
seen as a “treatment.” The tests match firms that we expect are more susceptible
to the negative effects of refinancing constraints (firms that had a large fraction of
their long-term debt coming due when the crisis hit) with “control” firms that need
not renegotiate their debt. To minimize concerns about selection, we match these
two groups of firms on the basis of their size, industry classification, credit ratings,
Q, long-term leverage ratio, cash flows, and cash holdings. The matching allows us
to compare otherwise similar firms, with the only salient difference being the profile
of their long-term debt maturity. The tests account for time-invariant heterogene-
2A large literature discusses how firms may deviate for years from “optimal” debt-to-asset ra-
tios (see, e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Welch (2004)). Arguably, the ability to secure an
optimal debt-maturity composition would probably be a lower-order concern if firms are unable to
secure the overall debt positions they might desire.
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ity by comparing within-firm changes in the outcome variables of interest from the
period that precedes the 2007 credit shock to the period that follows that shock.3
We consider a number of alternatives to our baseline experiment. These alterna-
tive experiments provide checks for the logic of our approach and further minimize
concerns about hard-wiring in our results. For example, we perform a battery of
falsification tests that replicate our matching estimation procedure in non-crisis pe-
riods. In principle, a firm whose debt matures at a time in which credit is easily
available should not display a constrained-type behavior that can be linked to ma-
turing debt. It is only the juxtaposition of firm debt maturity and a credit shortage
that should affect investment. In addition, we redefine our treatment and control
groups based on the degree to which long-term debt is an important component of
overall firm financing. According to the logic of our strategy, for those firms whose
long-term debt is only a small component of total financing, we should not see a
link between investment spending and the fact that a large fraction of long-term
debt is maturing during the crisis.
Our base findings are as follows. First, we document pronounced cross-firm vari-
ation in long-term debt maturity structure at the onset of the 2007 crisis. Cross-
sectional variation in long-term debt maturity is persistent over time, with similar
dispersion patterns observed in the years preceding the crisis. Importantly for our
strategy, we are able to isolate a sizable pool of firms with a large fraction of long-
term debt maturing right after the crisis (treated firms) that are virtually identical
to other firms whose debt happens to mature in later years (control group). We
show that these two groups of firms are similar across all characteristics we con-
sider, except for a local discontinuity in their long-term debt maturity structure.
We then show that a firm’s debt maturity structure has consequences for post-
crisis real outcomes.4 For firms in the treatment group, quarterly average invest-
ment rates dropped to 5.7% of capital — a fall of 2.1% relative to their pre-crisis
level. Firms in the control group hardly changed their spending. The Abadie-Imbens
estimate of the difference-in-differences in investment is −2.5% in our baseline ex-
periment. This drop in investment is economically substantive, representing a de-
cline of approximately one-third of pre-crisis investment levels. Confirming the
3We perform these tests using the Abadie and Imbens (2002) matching estimator (discussed in
detail below). We also perform similar tests using standard regression analysis later in the paper.
4Anticipating the details of the experiment, the pre-crisis period is defined as the first three
quarters of 2007 and the post-crisis period is defined as the first three quarters of 2008. In the
baseline tests, the treatment group contains firms for which the fraction of long-term debt ma-
turing within one year (i.e., in 2008) is greater than 20%; the control group contains firms for
which that fraction is lower than 20%. Firms are matched on covariates measured in the pre-crisis
period.
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logic of our strategy, the relation between maturing debt and investment disappears
when we use firms with insignificant amounts of long-term debt in the experiment.
On the flip side, that relation strengthens when we focus on firms for which long-
term debt is a more important source of financing (in this case, the relative change
in investment is −3.4%). We also find that the effect of maturity structure on in-
vestment is robust to many variations in the definitions of treatment and control
groups. Moreover, it only holds for the 2007 period. In particular, we replicate our
experiment over a number of years and find that maturity structure is unrelated
with changes in investment for these non-crisis (placebo) periods. In other words,
while discontinuities in debt maturity structure are generally unrelated to invest-
ment spending, they bind firm behavior when credit is tight.
Standard falsification tests allow us to tackle unobserved heterogeneity that
may help predict both a firm’s debt maturity profile and its subsequent invest-
ment. However, they cannot rule out stories that could be specific to the current
crisis. One such story is that “smarter CEOs” may have anticipated the August
2007 shock and refinanced (prior to the crisis) the part of their firms’ long-term
debt that was scheduled to mature in 2008. Another story is that “better firms”
may have elongated their debt during the boom years preceding the crisis. In order
to fend off these selection stories, we also perform tests in which we measure matu-
rity structure several years prior to the credit crisis (for example, we use 2005 data
to predict which firms would have large portions of debt maturing in 2008). Such
tests help rule out the possibility that endogenous debt renegotiation in the years
leading up to the crisis may explain our results. We find that these pre-determined
maturity profiles also predict changes in investment around the credit crisis.
A common concern with inferences from studies using the difference-in-differences
estimator in a treatment-effects framework is whether treatment and control group
outcomes followed “parallel trends” prior to the treatment — only in this case one
can ascribe differences in the post-treatment period to the treatment itself. Another
concern is whether alternative “macro effects” that differentially affect treatment
and control groups might explain the behaviors we observe in the post-treatment
period. Our matching estimator ensures that we are comparing firms from the same
industry with very similar characteristics such as credit quality, size, and profitabil-
ity, suggesting that these firms would behave similarly in the absence of refinancing
frictions. Still, we cannot rule out the possibility that there are latent group dif-
ferences that trigger contrasting behaviors in the post-treatment period because of
events — other than our proposed treatment — taking place in that period.
We tackle both of these concerns in our analysis. First, we compare pre-treatment
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trends in the outcomes (changes in investment) of our treatment and control groups.
Going back several years prior to 2007, we find no evidence that the investment
path of firms in those two groups followed different trends. Second, we examine
the concern that the recession that followed the 2007 shock may drive a differen-
tial wedge in the post-crisis investment of treatment and control firms, irrespective
of the credit shortage. To deal with this issue, we look for a period that precedes
a recession, but that lacks a sharp credit supply shock to identify a placebo treat-
ment. In other words, we try to eliminate the “credit-supply component” of our
treatment strategy, but allow for the same post-treatment macro effect (demand
contraction) that could potentially drive our results. Although it is difficult to find
a recession that is not preceded by a credit tightening, one can argue that the 2001
recession was not preceded by a credit shortage that is comparable to that of fall of
2007. This test shows no evidence of a differential recession-driven behavior for our
treatment and controls firms.
We also look at the value implications of maturing debt. We do so by compar-
ing stock returns and Qs of treated and control firms in 2007 and 2008. We find
that firms facing large debt payment obligations in 2008 not only invested less but
also lost relatively more value. We further complement our analysis by examin-
ing whether firms adjusted along other margins to accommodate their re-financing
gap. In particular, firms may have adjusted other real and financial policies, such as
drawing down cash balances, reducing inventory stocks, repurchasing fewer shares,
and cutting dividends. Our calculations suggest that the firms that were burdened
with large amounts of maturing debt in 2008 tapped their “least costly” sources of
funds the most. In particular, we find that the brunt of the shock to external fund-
ing was absorbed by firms’ cash balances. Consistent with Fazzari and Petersen
(1993), reductions in inventory were also pronounced across financially constrained
firms. Perhaps surprisingly, however, those firms did not cut their cash dividends
by much (see Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005)). We end our study with
a post-crisis analysis of corporate welfare, looking at firm performance all the way
until June 2010.
As we discuss below, the existing literature points to a link between debt ma-
turity and underlying firm quality. It is thus important for our strategy that we
compare firms that primarily rely on long-term debt financing (with the only differ-
ence being when that debt happens to come due). The downside of this approach is
that by focusing on a subset of firms concerns may be raised about how our results
would generalize to the full universe of firms. This concern reflects the common
tradeoff between internal and external validity in experiment-type tests. We note,
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however, that our sample contains over one thousand firms that account for 46% of
total market capitalization and 61% of corporate investment for the year 2007 in
the United States. Firms in our sample represent an important part of the corpo-
rate sector in their own right. In some of our experiments, hundreds of these firms
are selected into a treatment status, while in others only a few dozens. But these
numbers are not crucial per se. The goal of the experimental design is the random-
ness of the assignment of representative firms to a financial constraint status.
Perhaps surprisingly, there is only a small number of empirical studies examin-
ing the dispersion of corporate debt maturity (see, e.g., Barclay and Smith (1995),
Stohs and Mauer (1996), and Guedes and Opler (1996)). Barclay and Smith re-
port that firms that are large and with fewer growth options have more long-term
debt in their capital structures. Guedes and Opler show that large firms with high-
quality credit ratings typically borrow on the short and long ends of the maturity
spectrum, while firms with poor credit ratings borrow mid-term. These papers do
not consider the effect of supply shocks on corporate policies, nor look at varia-
tion in long-term debt maturity. Theory has also studied the determinants of matu-
rity structure, suggesting that both low- and high-credit quality firms are likely to
borrow short-term, but for different reasons (Diamond (1991, 1993) and Flannery
(1986)).5 For instance, firms that are heavy users of short-term debt are inherently
more likely to be adversely affected by a credit supply shock. As a result, one can-
not measure the effect of maturity structure on real outcomes simply by relating
the pre-crisis amounts of short- versus long-term debt and post-crisis outcomes.
Similarly to our paper, Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) focus on the impact
of the credit crisis on corporate investment. Their attempt at identifying firms that
are affected by the crisis hinges on firms’ cash and debt positions. While appealing,
as discussed above, their proposed strategy is subject to the criticism that firms’
cash and debt policies prior to the crisis may confound factors that explain those
firms’ post-crisis behavior. This makes it difficult to ascribe causality going from
financial policy to real firm outcomes. Related papers that do not look at the cur-
rent crisis are Chava and Purnanandam (2010) and Lemmon and Roberts (2010)
(see also Leary (2009)). Chava and Purnanandam examine the effects of the 1998
Brazil-Russia-LTCM crisis on corporate valuation. The authors find a larger valu-
ation impact upon bank-dependent firms whose main banks had greater exposure
to Russia. Lemmon and Roberts examine the effects of a contraction in the sup-
5Diamond and He (2010) derives optimal maturity structure by trading-off the debt overhang
effects of short- and long-term debt. The authors show that the overhang effect of short-term debt
may be greater than that of long-term debt.
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ply of risky credit (junk bonds) caused by changes in regulation and the collapse
of Drexel Burnham Lambert. Their evidence suggests that risky firms’ leverage re-
mained constant while their investment declined as a result of changes in the junk-
bond market landscape. Our study differs from these papers in that our strategy
dispenses with the need to focus on bank-dependent or risky firms to assess the im-
pact of credit supply shocks. In addition, we uniquely identify a feature of financial
contracting that transmits the impact of credit shocks onto firm investment.
Our study contains relevant implications for corporate financial policy. Our re-
sults imply, for example, that firms with similar debt-to-asset ratios may respond
very differently to a credit supply shock. Indeed, firms with relatively low debt ra-
tios can be more affected by such shocks, depending on the maturity composition
of their debt. This suggests additional caution when classifying firms based on their
observed leverage ratios as a way to gauge their response to macroeconomic events.
Our study is new in highlighting the extra attention corporate managers should
pay to the maturity profile of their firms’ debt. Debt maturity is a key aspect of fi-
nancial flexibility, an aspect that, according to our evidence, becomes particularly
important during credit contractions. Finally, our work adds to the understanding
of contracting by using a well-identified element of financial contracts (contract ma-
turity) to show how contracting affects firm behavior.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. We discuss our empirical
strategy in Section 1.2. Our baseline result that the financial contracting (debt ma-
turity structure) affects real corporate outcomes is presented in Section 1.3. In Sec-
tion 1.4, we conduct a number of additional tests designed to check the robustness
of our results. Section 1.5 shows long-term consequences of the financial constraints
we used in our tests. Section 1.6 concludes the paper.
1.2 Empirical Design
We start this section by describing our basic experimental design as well as the
matching estimator methodology that we employ. We then describe the data used
in our tests.
1.2.1 The “Experiment”
Our basic insight is that of exploiting variation in long-term debt maturity at the
onset of the 2007 crisis as a way to identify the effect of credit supply shocks on
corporate policies. Of course, the relevant question is how the composition of long-
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term debt maturity would affect real corporate policies. In a frictionless capital
markets, debt maturity is irrelevant because firms can always refinance and recon-
tract their way around the potential effects of a balloon debt payment. What is
special about credit crises is that financial markets are arguably less than friction-
less during those times. The 2007 crisis, in particular, affected traditional modes of
corporate financing, such as commercial paper, bond placements, bank loans, and
secondary equity issuance. In such an environment, soon-to-mature debt can effec-
tively reduce corporate investment, as firms find it difficult to substitute across al-
ternative funding sources while at the same time trying to avoid defaulting on their
debt payments. As a result, firms that were “unfortunate” to have large chunks
of debt maturing right around the 2007 crisis may be expected to face tighter fi-
nancing constraints than firms that do not have to finance balloon debt payments
during that same period.
1.2.1.1 The 2007 Credit Supply Shock
As discussed by Gorton (2008) and Acharya, Philippon, Richardson, and Roubini
(2009), the current crisis started with a reversal in housing prices in 2006, which
in turn triggered a wave of default of subprime mortgages going into 2007. The in-
crease in subprime defaults in the first half of 2007 initially affected financial in-
stitutions that had invested heavily in asset-backed securities (ABS). Acharya et
al. identify the collapse of two Bear Sterns-managed hedge funds in June 2007 as
a “salient” milepost of the systemic crisis. These hedge funds and other special
investment vehicles (e.g., bank SIVs) relied on short-term rollover debt to finance
holdings of long-term assets. By early August 2007, it was clear that investors were
no longer willing to rollover short-term financing to highly-levered institutions, as
exemplified by the run on BNP Paribas’ SIVs.6 Similar runs were observed across
many countries and markets in subsequent weeks. They were largely attributed to
the perceived lack of transparency of the investment portfolios of financial institu-
tions, and the possibility that large losses would be passed onto the balance sheet
of banks that sponsored investment vehicles such as SIVs.
As a result of these developments, the spreads on short-term financing instru-
ments reached historically high levels. This is illustrated by the time series of the 3-
month LIBOR and commercial paper spreads over comparable-maturity treasuries.
These series are plotted in Figure 1. There is a sharp, large shock to both of these
spreads around August 2007. Spreads go up from levels lower than 0.5% between
6See also Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2009) for a model of rollover risk that generates
market freezes like the one observed in August 2007.
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2001 and the summer of 2007, to levels between 1% and 2% following August 2007.
In particular, in July 2007 the average 3-month LIBOR spread was 0.5%. The LI-
BOR spread jumped to 1.3% in the month of August, staying above 1% in the sub-
sequent months.
The repricing of credit instruments that followed by the 2007 panic quickly went
beyond short-term bank financing, spilling over onto longer-term instruments. The
episode highlighted the interdependence of segments of the financial markets that
were once thought of as being isolated from each other. The lack of availability of
short-term financing is believed to have softened the demand for long-term bonds
by institutions such as hedge funds and insurance companies. The collapse of the
“repo” market further affected the demand for highly-rated corporate bonds, which
were used as collateral for borrowing agreements during “normal times.” Current
research on the crisis (and anecdotal evidence) suggests that these developments
led spreads on long-term corporate bonds to increase sharply. In Figure 2, we re-
port the time series of spreads for indices of investment grade and high yield bonds
(from Citigroup’s Yieldbook).7 Citigroup reports average duration and maturity for
the bond portfolios used in the construction of these indices. Given the reported
durations, which hover between 4 and 7 years, we chose the 5-year treasury rate as
a benchmark to calculate spreads. We note that the average credit quality of Cit-
igroup’s investment-grade and high-yield indices is, respectively, A and B+. Thus,
Figure 2 gives a fairly complete picture of the effect of the crisis on the spreads of
bonds with different credit quality.
The spreads on long-term corporate bonds show a dramatic increase starting
in August 2007, both for investment-grade and junk-rated firms.8 The figure shows
that August 2007 represents a turning point for corporate bond spreads. Investment-
grade spreads had been close to 1% since 2004. These spreads increased sharply to
1.6% in August of 2007, and towards levels that approached 3% during early 2008.
Junk bond spreads display a similar pattern, increasing from levels around 3% in
early 2007 to 4.6% in August, and then to between 7% and 8% in early 2008.9
Similar signs of a credit squeeze in the U.S. bond markets can be gathered from
quantity data. According to SDC’s New Issues Database, the total debt issuance
7We use Citigroup’s BIG CORP (investment-grade) and HY MARKET (high-yield) indices.
Almeida and Philippon (2007) also use Yieldbook data to calculate corporate bond spreads by
rating level.
8The spreads we present are very similar to the high-yield bond spreads reported in Figure P.2
in Acharya et al. (2009).
9Clearly, the Lehman crisis in the fall of 2008 had an additional negative impact on bond
spreads, which shot up momentarily to levels close to 7% for investment-grade bonds, and above
15% for high-yield bonds.
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with maturity greater than one year for the third quarter of 2007 amounted to $63
billion. There were a total of 165 deals registered in that quarter. To put these
numbers in perspective, the average quarterly amount of funds raised in the bond
market in the two years preceding the crisis was $337 billion, while the average
number of deals was 1,476.
At the same time that firms found it difficult to raise funds in the bond mar-
kets, banks were also cutting the loan supply. New commercial and industrial loans
extended by U.S. commercial banks dropped from $54 billion in February 2007 to
about $44 billion in February 2008 (cf. Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Busi-
ness Lending). Loans under commitment (lines of credit) dropped from $41 bil-
lion to $37 billion during the same period. Results from a recent study by Ivashina
and Scharfstein (2010) are also consistent with a significant drop in the supply of
new debt as a result of the financial crisis. The authors use Reuters’ LPC-DealScan
data to show that new loans to large borrowers fell by 79% from the peak of the
credit boom (second quarter of 2007) to the end of 2008. Lending for real invest-
ment and restructuring (LBOs, M&A, share repurchases) show similarly large drops
during the crisis period.
The existing evidence supports our conjecture that there was a substantial in-
crease in the cost of short- and long-term financing for firms as well as a fall in the
quantity of credit available for firms starting in August 2007. These movements
appear to be largely due to events that were initially associated with the housing
sector, and eventually affected financial institutions and the overall credit markets.
Such an environment provides us with a unique opportunity to identify the effects
of supply contractions on corporate policies.
1.2.1.2 The Maturity Structure of Corporate Long-Term Debt
Our identification strategy requires that there is enough variation in long-term debt
maturity across firms. In particular, there must exist a significant group of firms
that have a spike (or “discontinuity”) in their long-term debt maturity structure
appearing right after the crisis. Naturally, one could expect firms to have well-
diversified maturity structures, so that they are never forced to repay or refinance
significant amounts of debt in any particular year. If that was the case, it would be
difficult for us to implement our proposed strategy. As discussed in the introduc-
tion, and elsewhere in the literature, there seems to exist a number of first-order
frictions making it difficult for firms to maintain their optimal capital structures
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(assuming firms do pursue such policies in the first place).10 It would be hard to
imagine that firms are generally unable to be at their optimal debt-to-asset ratios
for many consecutive years, while at the same time maintaining an optimal debt
maturity structure. The existing literature provides limited guidance on this conjec-
ture. Hence, we find it interesting to investigate this in more detail.
Figure 3 depicts the distribution of debt maturities for the sample of firms used
in our analysis (the data are described in detail in Section 1.2.3). For each firm in
the third quarter of 2007, we have information on the amount of long-term debt
that matures in each of the following five years: 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012.11
Figure 3 reports these amounts as a fraction of total long-term debt. Accordingly,
for each vertical bar in the figure (representing a year), a firm can have anywhere
between 0% and 100% of its long-term debt coming due. For ease of visualization,
the figure pins down the debt maturity structures of two firms (described below).
For example, at the end of 2007, the long-term debt maturity structure of Dollar-
Thrifty (a treated firm) is as follows: 34% of its long-term debt is due in 2008, 0%
is due in 2009, 19% is due in 2010, 19% is due in 2011, and 19% is due in 2012.
If maturity structure was well diversified, we would expect this distribution to
have a large mass around a specific value.12 The figure makes it clear, however,
that there is significant cross-firm variation in maturity structure. Consider, for
example, the fraction of long-term debt that is due within the 1-year period follow-
ing the 2007 panic (i.e., in 2008). Figure 3 suggests that there exists a significant
number of firms whose long-term debt maturity concentrates in 2008 (some firms
have nearly 100% of their long-term debt maturing that year). At the same time,
many firms do not have any significant amount of long-term debt maturing in 2008.
Similar variation in maturities obtains for the other individual years. For exam-
ple, many firms have maturity spikes appearing in 2012, five years after the 2007
episode (some have 100% of their long-term debt maturing that year). These firms
are similar to the ones with concentrated maturity in 2008, in that they, too, allow
their debt maturity to concentrate in a particular year; however, their maturity is
concentrated in a future year that lies well beyond the 2007 crisis (i.e., five years
later).
10Starting from Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), researchers cite transactions costs ar-
guments as a key reason why firms may not instantaneously adjust their debt ratios (see also
Strebulaev (2007)). Alternative explanations include managerial “market timing” (Baker and
Wurgler (2002)) and simple inertia (Welch (2004)).
11We also know the amount of long-term debt that matures in more than five years (starting in
2013), though we do not have year-by-year information beyond five years.
12For example, if firms regularly issued 10-year bonds we would expect to see a mass at the
value of 10% in every year.
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Two other features of the distribution of debt maturity measured at the end
of 2007 are noteworthy (and useful for our test design). First, the distributions of
long-term debt maturing in the individual years beyond 2008 (2009 through 2012)
look fairly similar to the distribution of long-term debt maturing in 2008. This sug-
gests that firms may not always try to renegotiate in advance and elongate matu-
rities of debts that are soon to come due. Second, as depicted in Figure 4, the dis-
tributions of the long-term debt maturity of firms in 2007 are strikingly similar to
that of years prior to 2007. In other words, there is no clear evidence of changes in
long-term debt maturity structure in the years leading up to the 2007 crisis.
One possible reason why some firms end up with spikes in their debt maturity
distributions (such as those depicted in Figures 3 and 4) is that they may concen-
trate debt issuance in particular years. To provide some descriptive evidence on
these patterns, we use the Herfindahl index, a common measure of concentration.
From the sample of 1,067 firms that we use in our main analysis, we select those
whose long-term debt issuance variable (defined in detail below) is available for the
last ten years; that is, from 1998 through 2007. A Herfindahl index is then calcu-
lated using the percentage of debt (normalized by assets) that the firm issued in a
particular year with respect to the total issuance within the entire 10-year window.
If firms perfectly diversify their debt issuance over this 10-year window, we would
see a Herfindahl index of 0.10. As it turns out, the average Herfindahl index calcu-
lated from our sample is 0.34, suggesting that on average firms issue debt in about
3 of 10 years.
1.2.2 Counterfactual Matching Approach
We want to test whether firms that need to refinance their long-term obligations
at the time of a credit crisis alter decisions related to real-side variables. Our goal
is to develop an identification strategy that resembles an “experiment:” the firm’s
long-term debt maturity structure and developments in the financial markets coin-
cide such that the firm needs to refinance a large fraction of its debt in the midst of
a credit contraction. If debt maturity was randomly assigned across firms, then it
would suffice to compare the outcomes of firms that had significant debt maturing
around the time of the crisis with those whose debt happened to mature at a later
date. Our analysis, however, needs to account for the fact that we are not doing an
experiment, but instead relying on observational data.
The challenge is to gauge firms’ outcomes had they not been caught between a
credit crisis and the need to refinance their debt. One then needs to estimate the
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differences between counterfactual outcomes and those that are observed. One way
to tackle this problem is to use a parametric regression approach where the group
of interest is differentiated from other observations with a dummy variable. Under
this standard approach, outcome differences are estimated by the coefficient on the
group dummy. The regression model is specified according to a set of theoretical
priors about the outcome variable — a simple, linear representation of a particular
theory. Controls such as size, profitability, and leverage may be added to the spec-
ification to capture additional sources of firm heterogeneity. As demonstrated by
Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998), however, the inclusion of controls in
the regression per se does not address the fact that the groups being compared may
have very different characteristics (e.g., comparison groups with markedly different
size and profitability distributions).13 When control variables have poor distribu-
tional overlap, one can improve the estimation of group differences by allowing for
non-linear modeling as well as using non-parametric methods.
The strategy that we emphasize in our study is less parametric and more closely
related to the notion of a “design-based” test (see Angrist and Pischke (2010)). We
conduct this test with the use of matching estimators.14 The idea behind this fam-
ily of estimators is that of isolating treated observations (in our application, firms
with debt maturing during the crisis) and then, from the population of non-treated
observations, look for control observations that best “match” the treated ones in
multiple dimensions (covariates). In this framework, the set of counterfactuals are
restricted to the matched controls. In other words, it is assumed that in the ab-
sence of the treatment, the treated group would have behaved as the control group
actually did. The matches are made so as to ensure that treated and control obser-
vations have identical distributions along each and every one of the covariates cho-
sen (dimensions such as firm size, profitability, leverage, credit risk, etc.). Inferences
about the treatment of interest (refinancing constraints) are based on comparisons
of the ex-post outcomes of treatment and control groups.15
Although a number of matching estimators are available, we employ the Abadie
and Imbens (2002) estimator.16 The Abadie-Imbens (“full covariate”) estimator al-
lows one to match a treated firm with a control firm, with matching being made
13See also Dehejia and Wahba (2002).
14The approach has been used by, among others, Villalonga (2004), Malmendier and Tate
(2009), and Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010). For robustness, we also run standard re-
gressions (see Section 1.4.6). Those regressions confirm our central findings.
15In the treatment evaluation literature this difference is referred to as the average treatment
effect for the treated, or ATT (see Imbens (2004) for a review).
16In particular, we use the bias-corrected, heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator implemented
in Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens (2004).
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with respect to both categorical and continuous variables. The estimator aims at
producing “exact” matches on categorical variables. Naturally, the matches on con-
tinuous variables will not be exact (though they should be close). The procedure
recognizes this difficulty and applies a bias-correction component to the estimates
of interest.
In matching estimations, the specification used is less centered around the idea
of representing a model that explains the outcome variable. Instead, the focus is in
ensuring that variables that might both influence the selection into treatment and
observed outcomes are appropriately accounted for in the estimation. For example,
the outcome that we are most interested in is investment spending. While there are
numerous theories on the determinants of corporate investment, we only include in
our test covariates for which one could make a reasonable case for simultaneity in
the treatment–outcome relation. Among the list of categorical variables we include
in our estimations are the firm’s industrial classification and the rating of its pub-
lic bonds. Our non-categorical variables include the firm’s market-to-book ratio (or
“Q”), cash flow, cash holdings, size, and the ratio of long-term debt to total assets.
It is commonly accepted that those covariates capture a lot of otherwise unobserved
firm heterogeneity. By virtue of the full-covariate matching approach, our estima-
tions account for all variable interactions.
Lastly, we note that we model the outcomes in our experiments in a differenced
form — we perform difference-in-differences estimations. Specifically, rather than
comparing the levels of investment of the treatment and control groups, we com-
pare the changes in investment across the groups after the treatment. We do so
because the investment levels of the treated and controls could be different prior to
the event defining the experiment, and continue to be different after that event, in
which case our inferences could be potentially biased by these uncontrolled firm-
specific differences.
1.2.3 Data Collection and Variable Construction
We use data from COMPUSTAT’s North America Fundamentals Annual, Funda-
mentals Quarterly, and Ratings files. We start from the quarterly file and disregard
observations from financial institutions (SICs 6000–6999), not-for-profit organiza-
tions and governmental enterprises (SICs greater than 8000), as well as ADRs. We
drop firms with missing or negative values for total assets (atq), capital expendi-
tures (capxy), property, plant and equipment (ppentq), cash holdings (cheq), or
sales (saleq). We also drop firms for which cash holdings, capital expenditures or
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property, plant and equipment are larger than total assets.
Our data selection criteria and variable construction approach follows that of
Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), who study the effect of financing con-
straints on the management of internal funds, and that of Frank and Goyal (2003),
who look at external financing decisions. Similar to Almeida et al., we discard from
the raw data those observations for which the value of total assets is less than $10
million, and those displaying asset growth exceeding 100% (including firm-quarters
with missing values). We further require that firms’ quarterly sales be positive and
that the sales growth does not exceed 100%.
The data on debt maturity variables are only available in the COMPUSTAT an-
nual file. We merge the annual and the quarterly files to make use of debt maturity
information in our analysis. COMPUSTAT annual items dd1, dd2, dd3, dd4, and
dd5 represent, respectively, the dollar amount of long-term debt maturing during
the first year after the annual report (long-term debt maturing in 2008 for firms
with a December 2007 fiscal year-end), during the second year after the report
(long-term debt maturing in 2009 for firms with a December 2007 fiscal year-end),
during the third year after the report, and so on. COMPUSTAT annual item dltt
represents the dollar amount of long-term debt that matures in more than one year.
Accordingly, a firm’s total long-term debt can be calculated as dd1 + dltt.
We apply the following filters to the debt variables. We delete firms with total
long-term debt (dd1 + dltt) greater than assets (at, in the annual file) and firms for
which debt maturing in more than one year (dltt) is lower than the sum of debt
maturing in two, three, four, and five years (dd2 + dd3 + dd4 + dd5 ). In our
baseline tests, we disregard firms for which liabilities such as notes payables, bank
overdrafts, and loans payable to officers and stockholders are greater than 1% of
total assets. For those tests, we require firms to have long-term debt maturing be-
yond one year (dltt) that represents at least 5% of assets (at).17 These debt-related
restrictions are meant to help assure that we are contrasting firms of seemingly
comparable debt profile, with long-term debt representing an important source of
funds.18
We focus on firms that have 2007 fiscal year-end months in September, Octo-
ber, November, December, or January. The sample of firms with these fiscal year-
end months corresponds to more than 80% of the universe of firms in fiscal year
17In subsequent tests, we vary this and other debt-related cutoffs to ensure that our inferences
are robust.
18To operationalize our tests, we set the cutoff between short- and long-term debt at one year
(the standard benchmark in the literature). As we report in Section 4.8, our treatment and con-
trol firms historically issued long-term debt at the same frequency, about once every three years.
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2007. This restriction is due to the timing of the credit shock, which happened in
the fall of 2007. For our benchmark tests, we want to avoid firms that filed their
2007 annual report before the crisis. These firms could have used the time period
between filing the annual report and the credit crisis to rebalance their debt matu-
rity, thus compromising our identification strategy. As noted above, the variables
that detail the amount of long-term debt maturing within one, two, three, four, and
five years from the date of the report are only available in the annual COMPUS-
TAT file. Accordingly, for a December fiscal-year-end firm, we cannot use the third
quarter report to obtain a breakdown of timing of the debt maturity composition
as of 9/30/2007, we instead use the firm’s 2007 annual report to obtain the debt-
maturity breakdown as of 12/31/2007. Finally, to make it into our final sample, a
firm needs to have non-missing values for all variables that are used in our estima-
tions, including all covariates and the outcome variable. Our 2007 sample consists
of 1,067 individual firms.
In our base experiment, the outcome variable is the change in firm investment.
Investment is defined as the ratio of quarterly capital expenditures (COMPUS-
TAT’s capxy) to the lag of quarterly property, plant and equipment (ppentq).19
We measure the change in a firm’s investment around the fourth quarter of 2007
by taking the difference between the average quarterly investment of the first three
quarters of 2008 and the first three quarters of 2007. We use symmetric quarters
around the fourth quarter of 2007 to avert seasonality effects. We avoid using data
from the fourth quarter of 2008 to sidestep the effects of the Lehman debacle and
the deep recession that ensues soon after that event.
As discussed earlier, we match firms based on Q, cash flow, size, cash holdings,
and long-term leverage. Q is defined as the ratio of total assets plus market capital-
ization minus common equity minus deferred taxes and investment tax credit (atq
+ prccq×cshoq – ceqq – txditcq) to total assets (atq). Cash flow is defined as the
ratio of net income plus depreciation and amortization ( ibq + dpq) to the lag of
quarterly property, plant and equipment. Size is defined as the log of total assets.
Cash holdings is the ratio of cash and short-term investments (cheq) to total assets.
Long-term leverage is the ratio of total long-term debt (dd1 + dltt) to total assets.
Our matching estimator uses the averages of the first three quarters of 2007 of each
of these variables as covariates.
We also match firms on industry and credit ratings categories. Industry cate-
gories are given by firms’ two-digit SIC codes. Our credit ratings categories follow
19Note that capxy represents “year-to-date” capital expenditures. We transform this variable so
that it reflects quarterly values.
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the index system used by S&P and are defined as: investment grade rating (COM-
PUSTAT’s splticrm from AAA to BBB–), speculative rating (splticrm from SD to
BB+), and unrated ( splticrm is missing). Matching treatment and control firms
within the same industry and within the same debt ratings categories ensures that
differences in firms’ underlying business conditions (e.g., product demand) and
credit quality may not explain our results.
We construct treatment and control groups based on firms’ long-term debt ma-
turity schedule. In our benchmark specification, the treatment variable is defined
by the ratio of long-term debt maturing within one year (dd1 ) to total long-term
debt (dd1 + dltt). Firms for which this ratio is greater than 20% are assigned to
the treatment group, while firms for which this ratio is less than 20% are assigned
to the non-treated group. We stress that these criteria are used for convenience as
a way to initialize our test and that they will be altered later as way to check the
test’s internal consistency and generalize our findings. This base procedure assigns
86 firms to the treatment group. While we provide a full characterization of the
treatment and control firms in Section 1.3.1, it might be useful to describe a few
concrete examples of firms in our sample. We do this in turn.
1.2.4 Examples of Treatment and Control Firms
One of the firms in our treatment group comes from the car rental business: Dollar-
Thrifty. As depicted in Figure 3, in the fall of 2007, Dollar’s fraction of total long-
term debt maturing in 2008 was 34%. The fraction of long-term debt maturing be-
tween in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, was, respectively, 0%, 19%, 19%, and 19%; the
remainder 8% was due in more than five years. It is apparent that Dollar’s long-
term maturity schedule happened to have a “discontinuity” right at the time of the
crisis.
Our sample match for Dollar is Avis-Budget. The two firms are in the same in-
dustry, have about the same size, and are both high-yield bond issuers. However,
Avis’s long-term debt maturity structure was different from Dollar’s at the end of
2007. In particular, Avis had to refinance less than 1% of its debt in 2008. In the
subsequent four one-year windows (starting from 2009), it would have to repay 7%,
17%, 11%, and 26% of its long-term debt; with 39% due in later years. The wedge
between Dollar’s and Avis’s long-term debt maturity structures is depicted in Fig-
ure 3.
Another example of a treated firm in our sample comes from the trucking indus-
try. In the fall of 2007, JB Hunt’s long-term maturity profile was such that 26% of
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its debt was due in 2008. By comparison, Con-way was scheduled to refinance only
2% of its long-term debt in 2008 (but over 20% in 2010). JB Hunt and Con-way
are investment-grade bond issuers and both these firms enter our sample: Con-way
appears as JB Hunt’s control match.
A much-publicized case of crisis-related debt burden is also in our sample: Saks
Inc. In late 2007, Saks had 56% of its long-term debt coming due in 2008. Our con-
trol match for Saks is Bon-Ton Inc. (who operates, among others, Bergner’s and
Belk stores). Bon-Ton’s long-term debt due in one year was less that 1% of the to-
tal (but 28% of its debt was scheduled to come due in 2011).20 Another example
comes from the communications industry, where Dish Network is a treated firm and
Equinix its control match.
1.3 Baseline Results
We start by providing summary statistics for our samples of treated, non-treated,
and control firms. Our initial goal is to show that our procedure does a good job of
matching treatment to control firms along observable dimensions. We then present
our base empirical results. These results should be seen as a benchmark only, in
that the magnitude of the firm responses to our re-financing constraint treatment
will depend on how we define the treatment. For our benchmark case, we define
treatment in a manner that strike us as reasonable, but we later perturb the pa-
rameters that define the baseline treatment status to check its internal consistency.
1.3.1 Summary Statistics
Our matching approach is non-parametric, making it fairly robust to extreme ob-
servations. Treatment and control firm outcomes, however, are compared in terms
of mean differences. To minimize the impact of gross outliers on these comparisons,
we winsorize variables at the 0.5 percentile. Table 1 reports the (pre-crisis) median
values of the variables used in our matching procedure across various data groups.
We use the continuity-corrected Pearson χ2 statistic to test for differences in the
medians of the variables of interest across the groups.
Panel A compares the 86 treated firms in our sample with the remaining 981
firms that are not assigned into the treated group. The treated firms have higher
median Q, cash flows, and cash holdings. Treated firms are also smaller and have
20A portion of Bon-Ton’s operations (a number of retail chains) was bought from Saks just a
few years before the crisis. These two firms thus shared a number of similarities in Fall of 2007,
except the maturity structure of their long-term debt.
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a lower leverage ratio. As discussed above, these sample differences are expected,
given that we are relying on observational data rather than running a true exper-
iment. The goal of matching estimator techniques is to control for these distribu-
tional differences, which could affect both the selection into the treatment and the
post-crisis outcomes.
Panel B compares median values for treated and matched control firms. The
Abadie-Imbens estimator identifies a match for each firm in the treatment group
(thus, we have 86 firms in both the treated and control groups). Notably, after the
matching procedure, one finds no statistical differences in the median values of the
covariates we consider across treated and control firms.
Table 2 compares the entire distributions — rather than just the medians — of
the various matching covariates across the three groups. The results mirror those
reported in Table 1. Panel A shows that treated firms differ significantly from non-
treated firms. In particular, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of distributional differences
returns highly significant statistics for virtually all of the matching covariates. As
in Table 1, these differences disappear when we compare the treated firms to the
group of closely-matched control firms. In particular, Panel B of Table 2 shows that
there are no statistical differences in the distributions of the various matching co-
variates across the treated and control firms. These statistics support the assertion
that the matching estimator moves our experiment closer to a test in which treat-
ment and control groups differ only with respect to when their long-term debt ma-
tures.
1.3.2 The Real Effects of the 2007 Panic
We examine the investment behavior of our treated and matched control firms around
the 2007 credit crisis. Before doing so, however, we perform a group-mean compar-
ison between the 86 treated firms and the broader set of 981 firms that we classify
as non-treated. Note that these comparisons are equivalent to a standard OLS in
which the outcome of interest (investment changes) is regressed on a dummy for
treated firms. Panel A of Table 3 shows that prior to the crisis, both the treated
and non-treated firms were investing at different rates. The average investment-to-
capital ratio in the three first quarters of 2007 (the pre-crisis period) is 7.8% for the
treated firms and 6.5% for the non-treated firms, though the difference is not sta-
tistically significant as indicated in the third row of the panel. The fact that both
groups of firms had different investment levels in the pre-crisis period suggests that
comparisons between the two groups could be potentially confounded by other fac-
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tors.
Panel A of Table 3 also shows the investment levels in the first three quarters
of 2008 (the post-crisis period). Notice that the investment of the treated and non-
treated firms fell in 2008. For firms in the treatment group, the average investment
dropped to 5.7% of capital (a fall of 2.1%). In contrast, for non-treated firms, in-
vestment fell to 6.0% (a fall of 0.6%). These figures suggest that investment de-
creased by 1.6% more for firms that happened to have a lot of long-term debt ma-
turing right after the credit crisis hit, relative to the “general population” of firms
whose long-term debt did not come due so soon.
Panel B of Table 3 presents a full-fledged implementation of our difference-in-
differences matching estimator. Firms in the treatment groups are now compared
with closer counterfactuals (matched controls). Not surprisingly, we see that the
2007 (pre-crisis) investment levels of treatment and control firms are economically
similar and statistically indistinguishable. Results in Panel B show that the invest-
ment policies of the treated and control firms became significantly different after
the crisis. While the average quarterly investment of firms in the treatment group
fell by 2.1%, control firms’ investment remained largely unchanged. The estimates
imply that investment decreased by 2.2% more for firms that had a lot of long-term
debt maturing right after the crisis, relative to otherwise similar firms whose long-
term debt did not come due as soon.
One interesting observation about the figures in Panel B is that the investment
of the control firms did not fall in 2008. The characteristics of the treated firms
may explain why the of the control firms does not decline following the crisis. No-
tice that firms in the treatment group have greater cash holdings, higher cash flows,
and lower leverage ratios than those in the general, non-treated sample popula-
tion (see Table 1). By construction, firms in the control group will then also have
greater cash holdings, higher cash flows, and lower leverage than the average sam-
ple firm. Given that they did not have to refinance significant amounts of debt fol-
lowing the crisis, control firms could use their more liquid positions to support in-
vestment going into 2008. In other words, corporate investment falls only for the
group of high-cash holdings, high-cash flows, low-leverage firms that happen to have
long-term debt repayment spikes appearing in 2008 (treated firms).
Panel B also reports the differential change in investment that is produced by
the Abadie-Imbens matching estimator (ATT). The ATT difference is equal to
−2.5%.21 This is a central result of our paper. It indicates that investment for the
21That estimate would equal −2.2% (the simple average difference effect) if it were not for the
“bias-correction” that is embedded in the estimator that helps dealing with the problem of match-
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treated firms during the first three quarters of 2008 fell by about one-third of their
pre-crisis investment levels.22 More generally, the estimates in Panel B imply that
frictions that arose from firms’ debt maturity structures generated financing con-
straints the led to lower corporate investment rates following the 2007 credit crisis.
These findings highlight the importance of debt maturity structure for corporate
managers. They are also interesting for economic policymakers when designing poli-
cies aimed at softening the impact of credit contractions on the economy.
Given the similarity between firms in the treatment and control groups, the ev-
idence presented is indicative of a causal effect of debt maturity on investment. In
order to strengthen the interpretation of the results, we replicate exactly the same
“experiment” that we run for the crisis period around a placebo period dated one-
year earlier. That is, we use 2006 maturity information to sort firms into treatment
and non-treated groups and 2006 covariates to produce a matched group of firms.
We then examine firms’ investment behavior during the first three quarters of 2007.
This falsification test can help us rule out alternative explanations for the results
reported in Panel B. For example, there could be unobservable characteristics that
generally predict both a short-maturity profile for long-term debt and a drop in
investment (characteristics that are not captured by the matching estimator pro-
cedure described in Section 1.2.2). If this is the case, then maturity structure and
investment should be correlated in 2006 as well, and not just in the 2007 crisis pe-
riod.
The results from this base placebo test are reported in Panel C of Table 3. As
in Panel B, treated and control firms have virtually identical investment behavior
in 2006. Firms with more than 20% of their long-term debt maturing in 2007 (the
“treatment” group) display an investment rate of 7.3% in the first three quarters
of 2006, while their control counterparts’ investment rate is 7.2%. Notably, there is
no difference in investment behavior across these two groups of firms in the post-
“treatment” period (first three quarters of 2007), despite the different maturity pro-
files of long-term debt: both groups invest 6.9% on average in the first three quar-
ters of 2007. The average treatment effect (ATT) in this case is virtually zero, and
statistically insignificant. Simply put, our treatment–control contrasts do not ap-
pear in 2006, when there was no credit shortage.
ing on continuous variables (see Section 1.2.2).
22 To ensure that our ATT results are not explained by extreme data points, we redo our ex-
periment 85 times taking away one treated firm at a time. The lowest ATT estimate is –2.1%
(significant at 5% test level) and the highest –2.9% (significant at 1%).
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1.3.3 Valuation Effects
While the tests in Table 3 show that firms with debt maturing right after the 2007
panic invested less, they are silent on the value implications of that effect. One
would like to know, for example, if the treated firms were overinvesting in the pre-
crisis period, in which case the decline in investment could be value enhancing. Our
empirical strategy is designed to ensure that the investment policies of treated and
control firms were as similar as possible in the pre-August 2007 period.23 Yet, a
valuation-based test could give additional context to the real-side implications of
debt maturity and credit shortages.
To gauge the value implications of our investment-based tests, we compute the
cumulative stock returns and the percentage change in Q for our treated, control,
and non-treated firms over the outcome window (the first three quarters of 2008).
We then perform mean-comparison tests to assess group differences. The results
are reported in Table 4. Focusing first on returns, the table shows that non-treated
firms’ stock values declined, on average, 21% over the first three quarters of 2008
(the S&P return for that same period is –22%). Control firms’ stocks fared slightly
better, declining 18%. Treated firms, in contrast, saw their stocks decline by 29%.
When we compare the stock performance of treated and control firms, we see a 11%
differential value performance (in favor of control firms). This difference is not only
economically meaningful, but also statistically significant (p-value of 2%). Compar-
isons based on Q lead to similar inferences about the more pronounced value losses
observed by treated firms in the first three quarters of 2008.
While it is impossible to ascertain whether firms were over or underinvesting
in the pre-crisis period, we can say that firms that were faced with large debt re-
payment obligations in 2008 invested less and lost more value at the same time.
Our results are thus consistent with the argument that firms that faced greater re-
financing constraints lost more value, plausibly due to the real-side adjustments
they were forced to make. The tests provide independent validation of the real and
value consequences of financial contracting.
23Recall, we match firms on an number of dimensions that are associated with their pre-crisis
policies and valuation (such as cash holdings, leverage, cash flow, and Q). In addition, we show
below that the investment spending of the treated and control firms followed “parallel trends”
prior to August 2007.
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1.4 Robustness Tests
In this section we show that our benchmark results are robust and internally con-
sistent. First, we show that the 2007 crisis results do not obtain in non-crisis peri-
ods. We also show that our results cannot be explained by firms selectively mod-
ifying their debt maturity structure in the years preceding the crisis. In addition,
we show that our results cannot be ascribed to differential trends in the outcome
of interest (investment), nor can they be attributed to differential responses across
treated and control firms that could arise in recession periods (independently of the
credit shortage). We show that the treatment–outcome relations that we uncover
in our baseline tests respond sensibly to changes in treatment intensity (changes
in leverage cut-offs and amount of debt due in 2008). The results are also robust
to changes in the design of the matching estimator. Finally, we report the results
obtained when we use standard regression techniques.
1.4.1 Evidence from Non-Crisis Periods
Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that firms with maturing long-
term debt find it difficult to refinance their obligations by tapping other external
financing sources. The 2007 credit crisis provides us with an ideal setting in which
this assumption is likely to hold. By the same token, the assumption is unlikely to
hold in periods of easier credit. If our identification strategy is correct, we would
expect not to find similar effects of maturity structure on investment during non-
crisis periods. Panel C of Table 3 verifies whether this is true for the year of 2006
(one year before the August 2007 credit event). Here, we generalize these placebo
tests across years prior to 2006, reporting results on a year-by-year basis as well as
pooled over the pre-crisis 2002–2006 period.24 To replicate our testing strategy for
years prior to 2006, we sort firms into treatment and non-treatment groups consid-
ering maturity structures measured in 2001 through 2005, as if there were credit
crises in the fourth quarter of each of those years. We then examine the differential
change in investment for treated and control firms. We perform this test for each
individual non-crisis year, using the exact same sampling criteria, covariate match-
ing approach, and definitions of treatment and control groups that we used for the
credit crisis period.
The results are reported in Table 5, which also reports the results for 2006 and
24We start in the early 2000’s because it is difficult to classify the late 1990’s as a non-crisis
period in light of episodes such as the LTCM debacle and the Asian crisis. In addition, we later
focus separately on the year 2001 because it contains a recession, but not a credit crisis.
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2007 for reference. The estimated difference in investment changes across treatment
and control groups is economically small and statistically insignificant for placebo
crises in all years between 2001 and 2006. The pooled ATT estimate from 2001
through 2006 is 0.0%. These findings are internally consistent and support our as-
sertion that debt maturity affects investment through a (re-)financing constraint
channel in the aftermath of a credit supply contraction.
1.4.2 Parallel Trends and Macro Effects
1.4.2.1 Parallel Trends
A concern about inferences from studies using the treatment-effects framework is
whether the data processes generating the treatment and control group outcomes
followed “common or parallel trends” prior to the treatment. Differences in the
post-treatment period can only be ascribed to the treatment when this assumption
holds. The outcome variable of our study is the within-firm change in investment
spending. Recall, our matching procure rendered treatment and control matches
with very similar investment going back three quarters prior to the crisis (see Ta-
bles 1 and 2). The threat is that although quarterly investment levels might be
similar for the two groups of firms for about a year prior to 2008, those firms’ in-
vestments could be following different long-term trends in the period leading up to
the crisis. The best way to address this concern is to look at data associated with
the outcome variable (changes in investment) going farther back in time.
Table 6 reports the mean and median quarterly change in investment for firms
in the treatment and control groups going back up to ten years prior to the fourth
quarter of 2007. The first row in the table reports statistics for changes in invest-
ment going back two years prior to the 2007 crisis quarter (quarterly investment
changes from 2005Q3 through 2007Q3). Similar statistics are reported in the sec-
ond row of the table, where the data go back three years (2004Q3 through 2007Q3).
Subsequent rows go back farther in time. The table also reports p-values associ-
ated with test statistics for differences in means (standard t-test) and in medians
(continuity-correct Pearson’s χ2) across groups.
It is apparent from the estimates reported in Table 6, in particular from the p-
values for t- and Pearson-tests, that our experiment’s outcome variable was indis-
tinguishable across treatment and control firms going back as far as ten years prior
to the fourth quarter of 2007. It is difficult to make the case that the investment
processes of firms in those two groups were following very different trends before
the credit shock.
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1.4.2.2 Macro Effects
Another potential concern regarding our difference-in-differences approach is whether
other “macro effects” affecting both treatment and control firms might explain the
differential behavior we observe in the post-treatment period (irrespective of any ef-
fects arising from differences in debt-maturity composition). This concern is valid
when one has reasons to believe that there are important, latent differences be-
tween treatment and control firms and these differences trigger sharp treatment–
control contrasts in the post-treatment period because of other changes in the envi-
ronment.
Like previous papers examining the consequences of a credit crisis, our post-
treatment period encompasses a recession, a time when corporate demand for in-
vestment generally declines. The advantage of our strategy over other comparable
studies is that it does not rely on firm policies (e.g., leverage, size, or cash holdings)
that are inherently linked to factors that can drive differential behavior over the
business cycle. For instance, it would not be surprising to see high-leverage/low-
cash firms performing particularly poorly during the recession that followed the
2007 crisis if confounding heterogeneity in firm quality (related to profitability, risk,
access to capital, etc.) was not properly accounted for. Regarding our strategy, in
contrast, it is difficult to articulate an argument for a systematic association be-
tween the maturity structure of long-term obligations and firm quality. While the
existing literature provides no evidence of such links, we design an additional test
that speaks to this concern.
We argue that the combination of a credit supply shock with maturing debt
may have pronounced effects on corporate spending. The concern, however, is that
the ensuing recession may somehow drive a differential wedge in the post-crisis in-
vestment behaviors of treatment and control firms, a difference that could explain
our findings. To examine this argument, we look for a period that precedes a reces-
sion, but that lacks a credit supply shock to identify a placebo treatment. In other
words, we eliminate one of the key elements of our treatment strategy (credit short-
age), but allow for the same macro effects (demand contraction) that could drive
our 2007 findings to see if similar treatment–control contrasts emerge. If they do
emerge, then there is reason to believe that developments in the general environ-
ment that followed our proposed treatment — and not the treatment itself — may
explain our results.
Given the data requirements of our matching strategy, we focus on the 2001 re-
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cession.25 It is easy to show that the credit conditions that accompanied the 2001
recession are very different from the credit crisis that started in 2007. Consider, for
example, the figures that we analyzed in Section 1.2.1.1. At the onset of the cri-
sis (February 2001), 3-month LIBOR and commercial paper spreads were at 0.4%
and 0.3%, respectively. These spreads declined during 2001, to levels close to 0.1%
(LIBOR) and 0.1% (commercial paper) in December 2001. There is also no evi-
dence of increases in credit spreads during 2001. Investment-grade and junk bond
spreads were 1.9% and 8.2%, respectively, at the onset of the recession (February
2001).26 They remained close to these levels during 2001, ending the year at 1.8%
(investment-grade) and 8.0% (junk). The evidence we gather suggests that the 2001
recession was not accompanied by a credit supply shock of significant magnitude.
We replicate our baseline experiment for the 2001 recession as if there was a
pronounced credit supply shock at the beginning of that recession. To be precise,
we take that the treatment period is the first quarter of 2001 (as opposed to the
fourth quarter of 2007). Analogously, the pre-treatment and post-treatment peri-
ods are, respectively, the last three quarters of 2000 and the last three quarters of
2001. If our prior results simply reflected the differential response of treatment and
control groups to a recession (regardless of the credit contraction), we should see
similarly strong treatment–control contrasts in these new tests. However, this is
not what we find. The simple difference-in-differences estimator for investment out-
comes in the 2001 recession yields a positive, statistically insignificant value of 1.2%
(compared to equal to −2.2% in the 2007 baseline). Similarly, the Abadie-Imbens
ATT estimate for this test is 1.4% (compared to −2.5% for 2007).
Our post-treatment–recession check makes it difficult to argue that effects that
are associated with recessions — and not a credit supply shortage — might explain
the results of our tests.
1.4.3 Pre-Determined Maturity Tests
Our baseline experiment uses maturity variables measured near the end of 2007.
As explained in Section 1.2.3, we made this choice to ensure that we capture the
extent to which firms are constrained by debt maturity during the shock. This re-
quirement should increase the power of our tests. However, it may raise the concern
that measured variation in maturity reflects the anticipated effects of the crisis. For
example, suppose that higher quality managers were more likely to anticipate the
25Information on debt maturity from COMSPUSTAT for the 1980’s and 1990’s recessions is
very sparse.
26These data come from Citigroup’s Yieldbook (described in Section 1.2.1.1).
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credit crisis in early 2007, or even in 2006. Then, it is possible that unobservable
managerial quality could explain both longer maturity profile and superior firm per-
formance in the aftermath of the crisis. Such refinancing activity by “smart CEOs”
would leave only the “dumb CEOs” with long-term debt maturing in 2008. In this
way, some firms (those with “dumb CEOs”) may cut investment for non-maturity-
related reasons after the credit crisis hits. Another alternative explanation speaks
to the credit easing that took place before the crisis. One could argue that firms
elongated their debt in the years prior to the crisis and that “better firms” elon-
gated their debt maturity by more, reducing the odds that they would be caught
with large amounts of debt coming due in 2008. Both stories relate to dynamics
that are differentially pronounced across our two firm groups, that potentially con-
found quality, and that are timed so as to potentially affect the interpretation of
our 2007 tests. The placebo tests of Section 1.4.1 do not address these concerns be-
cause they are specific to the 2007 crisis.
A simple way to ensure that the above self-selection stories do not drive our re-
sults is to use maturity variables measured several years prior to the end of 2007.
For example, we can examine firms’ maturity profiles at the end of 2005 — about
two years before the crisis — and identify firms that had a large fraction of their
long-term debt maturing in three years (i.e., in 2008). Since it is unlikely that even
the best managers could have anticipated the 2007 credit crisis back in 2005, such
modification of our basic specification can address the unobservable managerial
quality story. For robustness, we also experiment with using a maturity profile
measured an additional two years earlier, fiscal-year end 2003, which is the earli-
est we can go back given COMPUSTAT’s information on long-term debt maturity.
Naturally, as we go back to earlier years to measure maturity, the effect of matu-
rity structure on 2008 investment should decrease in magnitude (since the matu-
rity information becomes stale with time). For both earlier snapshots (2003 and
2005), the treatment group again includes firms that have more than 20% of their
long-term debt at the time maturing in 2008. Other than using alternative pre-
determined maturity profiles to assign treatment and non-treatment groups, all
other components of the experiment remain unchanged. Accordingly, the outcome
variables are defined identically to those in Table 3, that is, changes in investment
between the first three quarters of 2008 and the first three quarters of 2007.
The results (untabulated) suggest that the pre-determined maturity profiles also
help predict changes in investment around the credit crisis. As should be expected,
the effects of maturity structure on investment (−1.4% when using the 2005 ma-
turity and −0.6% when using the 2003 maturity) are smaller than those in Table
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3. Despite the lower estimates, cross-group difference in treatment effects are still
economically meaningful.27 While better quality firm/managers may have elongated
their debt maturity in the years preceding the crisis, it was not the case that they
did so differentially across treatment and control groups that are determined on the
basis of long-term debt structure in 2003 or 2005. Simply put, the results we obtain
seem to suggest that unobserved quality stories that influence debt maturity struc-
ture (refinancing) in the years leading up to the crisis are unlikely to explain the
relation between debt maturity and investment that we report in Table 3.
1.4.4 Robustness of Treatment Assignments
To test whether refinancing frictions have real implications, our benchmark esti-
mation assigns to the treatment group firms whose long-term debt due in 2008
is greater than 20% of total long-term debt. The benchmark case also focuses on
firms for which the ratio of long-term debt maturing in more than one year to total
assets was higher than 5%. These are arbitrary choices that we make for the pur-
pose of operationalizing our test. It is important that we verify what happens when
we alter these criteria.
1.4.4.1 Changing the Due-to-Total Long-Term Debt Cutoff
We first experiment with changes in the ratio of due-to-total long-term debt. The
test we design is such that, else the same, this cutoff captures the importance of the
financing shortfall caused by the maturing debt. One would expect the impact of
the maturing debt to be smaller if firms had smaller proportions of their debt com-
ing due in 2008, and larger if firms had larger proportions of their debt maturing at
that time. In the logic of the treatment-effect framework, this is akin to expecting
smaller (larger) effects to be associated with smaller (larger) doses of the treatment.
Accordingly, we examine what happens to our central results as we experiment with
alternative cutoffs of the due-to-total long-term debt ratio. We do this focusing on
cutoffs that are located in the neighborhood of the benchmark case.
The results of this experiment are presented in Table 7. In the first column, we
report the changes in investment that obtain when we experiment with a 15% cut-
off for the ratio of long-term debt due in 2008 to total long-term debt. As should
be expected, the differences between treatment and control groups becomes smaller
27The difference in investment using the end-of-year 2005 debt maturity is significant at the 5%.
The difference in investment using the end-of-year 2003 debt maturity is statistically insignificant
(t-statistic equal to 1.0).
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after we allow into the treatment group firms with lower proportion of debt ma-
turing in 2008 (the treatment group size increases to 129). The simple difference-
in-differences estimate is −1.5%, while the ATT is −1.3% (both only marginally
statistically significant). This contrasts with our benchmark result (20% cutoff),
which is reported in the second column of the table. In the third column of the ta-
ble, the test only includes firms whose proportion of long-term debt due in 2008
is higher than 25% of long-term debt. The test now focuses on 62 firms with very
larger portions of debt coming due in the crisis. Consistent with our priors, the fall
in investment for treated firms relative to control firms becomes more pronounced,
equal to −3.7% of capital (significant at the 1% test level).
1.4.4.2 Changing the Long-Term Leverage Cutoff
Long-term debt maturity should matter only for firms that have significant amounts
of long-term debt in their capital structures. According to the logic of our strategy,
increasing the cutoff for the fraction of long-term debt in firms’ capital structures
should result in larger post-crisis effects of maturity on investment. By the same to-
ken, including firms that do not have significant long-term debt should weaken the
estimated effects.
Table 8 shows evidence that is consistent with this hypothesis. In the first col-
umn, we report the changes in investment that obtain when we allow into the sam-
ple those firms whose long-term debt maturing in more than one year is less than
5% of assets (i.e., we eliminate the 5% debt-to-asset cut-off). Consistent with ex-
pectations, the estimated differences between treatment and control groups dis-
appears after this change. The simple difference-in-differences estimate is 0.0%,
while the ATT is now positive at 0.2% (both are statistically insignificant). This
contrasts with the 5% benchmark case, which is displayed in the second column of
the table. In the third column, the test only includes firms whose long-term debt
maturing in more than one year is greater than 10% of assets. Now, the fall in in-
vestment for treated firms is much deeper, equal to −3.4% of capital (significant at
5% level).
The evidence in Tables 6 and 7 help substantiate the hypothesis that treated
firms found it difficult to refinance their maturing long-term debt during the crisis
period, cutting their investment as a result. As we increase (relax) the severity of
their circumstances (“treatment dosage”), the effects we measure increase (dimin-
ish).
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1.4.5 Alternative Specifications for the Matching Estimator
In addition to the checks described above, we have experimented with several vari-
ations in our procedure to construct treatment and control groups, as well as in the
set of matching covariates. To illustrate the robustness of our results, we discuss
two of these exercises in this section.
Our benchmark specification defines the treatment group as all firms for which
the ratio of long-term debt maturing within one year to total long-term debt is
greater than 20%. The non-treated group contains all the other firms that satisfy
the sampling restrictions (in particular, a minimum level of long-term debt over as-
sets). As an alternative approach, we considered a control group that includes only
firms that have more than 20% of their long-term debt maturing in exactly five
years (that is, in 2012). These firms are similar to those in the treatment group in
that they also allow their maturity structures to be poorly diversified across years
(“sloppy debt maturity management”). However, they happen to have concentrated
their maturity in a time period that lies far in the future.28 The estimated differ-
ence in investment changes (the matching estimator ATT) remains negative, equal
to −1.6%, and statistically significant (standard error of 0.9) after this change in
definition.
We have also experimented with including the 2007 investment level among the
set of matching covariates to ensure that we are comparing firms that were at the
same starting point of investment before the crisis. The matching estimator’s av-
erage treatment effect is virtually unchanged after this modification in the set of
covariates; point estimate of −2.3%, with a standard error of 0.9.
1.4.6 Standard Regression Tests
While the non-parametric matching approach is well-suited for our test strategy, it
is useful to show that our results also hold when we use a standard regression ap-
proach. To do this, we regress the investment variable considered in our tests on a
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the ratio of long-term debt matur-
ing in 2008 to total long-term debt is greater than 20%, and zero otherwise. For
all specifications, we also perform placebo regressions that focus on changes in in-
vestment during non-crisis periods (the years between 2001 and 2007). We also run
a pooled 2001–2008 OLS regression to estimate differences between the crisis and
non-crisis periods.
28We choose five years because this is the farthest one-year information that is available in
COMPUSTAT.
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As shown in Panel A of Table 3, without including controls in the OLS, firms
with over 20% of their long-term debt maturing in 2008 cut their investment by
1.6% more than other firms. That group-mean difference estimate is significant
at the 10% test level. Over the pre-crisis period (2001–2007), when we would ex-
pect a firm’s debt maturity to have no effect on investment decisions, the difference
across the two groups is essentially zero (point estimate of −0.1%). The difference
in the two estimates (financial crisis effect less pre-financial crisis effect) is a fall in
investment of 1.5% (significant at the 10% test level). We also estimate investment
regressions including all of the controls used in Panel B of Table 3 (size, industry,
credit ratings, Q, long-term leverage ratio, cash flows, and cash holdings). While
these firm controls predict changes in investment in their own right, their inclusion
does not materially alter the coefficient on debt maturity.29 The estimated group-
mean difference changes slightly to 1.7% (significant at the 5% level) after we add
those controls. Over the pre-crisis period, this difference is again essentially zero
(point estimate of 0.0%), yielding a difference in the two estimates (financial crisis
less pre-financial crisis) of a fall in investment of 1.7% (significant at the 5% level).
These results are very consistent with those reported under the matching estimator
approach.
1.4.7 Further Analysis of Treated Firms’ Finances
One potential concern is that treated firms’ long-term debt maturity could be com-
paratively more concentrated, and that could be correlated with characteristics that
explain their performance during the crisis (for example, poor financial manage-
ment). To examine this issue, we consider the Herfindahl index (HHI) measure of
debt concentration that we discuss in Section 1.2.1.2. We find that the HHI of long-
term debt for treated, control, and non-treated firms are, respectively, 0.38, 0.37,
and 0.34. These numbers are economically and statistically identical, suggesting
that these groups of firms historically issued debt at the same frequency, but the
treated firms were just unfortunate enough to have a good share of their debt com-
ing due right after August 2007.
Finally, we make use of ex-post data to check our hypothesis about a freeze in
the market for long-term debt during the crisis (refinancing constraints). To do so,
we look at the debt issuance activity of our treated firms, calculating the ratio of
long-term debt issuance in 2008 to the long-term debt that was due in 2008. Cor-
29We discuss the results for regression models that use the same controls of the matching es-
timations for consistency. However, a number of other OLS specifications (with added controls,
such as variables in changes) lead to similar results.
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roborating our hypothesis, we find that the mean (median) issuance-to-maturing
debt ratio is only 12.6% (0.0%) in 2008. Our study traces the impact of this abrupt
external financing shortfall on firms’ outcomes.
1.5 Extensions
In this section we extend our base analysis to other dimensions of firm policy-making
and also consider the longer-term consequences of the re-financing constraint sta-
tus we used in our tests. We start with a “back-of-the-envelope” calculation that
shows how firms with ballooning debt payments in 2008 responded to the credit cri-
sis along other dimensions besides investment policy.
1.5.1 What Else Did Firms Do?
The evidence thus far suggests that firms with large amounts of debt maturing
in 2008 were forced to cut investment in order to be able to repay their maturing
debt. However, investment is not the only policy variable that these firms could
have adjusted in the aftermath of the crisis. Here, we examine post-crisis changes
in other policies that the treated firms could have used to absorb the effect of the
credit squeeze. Even if it was difficult or impossible for firms to respond to the cri-
sis by issuing additional external finance, they could potentially make up for the
debt payment by adjusting other variables, such as drawing down cash reserves,
reducing stocks of inventory, repurchasing fewer shares, and/or cutting dividends.
If the treated firms found it necessary to cut investment (which is a costly mea-
sure), one would also expect them to adjust, for example, the amount of share re-
purchase activities that they undertake in the aftermath of the crisis.30 In addition,
one could expect firms to draw down on their cash balances and reduce inventories.
The literature suggests that cash balances are held in part to hedge against nega-
tive shocks such as the 2007 crisis (see Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004)).
Moreover, there is evidence that firms use inventories to smooth out the effects of
fluctuations in the availability of internal funds (Fazzari and Petersen (1993)).
To provide some evidence on these additional policies, we perform a simple,
“back-of-the-envelope” analysis of how the firms in our experiment responded to
the credit crisis. Across our treated firms, we calculated the average amount of
long-term debt due in 2008, as well as the amount of “cuts” conducted elsewhere
30The survey evidence in Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) suggests that share re-
purchases are the residual after the investment and dividend decisions have been made.
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to help pay off this debt (besides investment reductions) — inventories, share re-
purchases, dividends, and cash holdings. These variables were present for 77 of our
86 treated firms.
For this sample of 77 firms, we compute the average changes in all of the policy
variables above, between the first three quarters of 2007 and the first three quarters
of 2008. For our two stock variables (cash holdings and inventories), we just take
the differences in the average value of their levels in the first three quarters of 2008
relative to the first three quarters of 2007. For the quarterly flow variables (invest-
ment, share repurchases, and dividends), we convert the differences in the average
quarterly flow to an annual flow basis for ease of comparison with the stock vari-
ables. For example, the quarterly reduction of investment (normalized by capital)
of 2.1% for the treated firms reported in the first row of Panel B of Table 3, repre-
sents an annual decline of 8.4%. To facilitate comparisons with our estimate of the
fall in investment, we normalize all other variables by the value of the capital stock
as well. We then take averages across all 77 of our treated firms to see how much
they drew down their cash reserves, cut dividends, etc. We finally compare these
figures with the average amount of debt they had coming due in 2008.
Figure 5 provides a visual illustration of the treated firms’ responses to the
credit crisis. The figure displays the average changes in various corporate policy
variables as a fraction of the total amount of long-term debt maturing in 2008. The
decline in investment spending in 2008 represents about one-eighth of the amount
of long-term debt these firms had coming due in 2008. By comparison, the treated
firms drew down from their cash reserves amounts that represent about two-fifths
of the amount of debt due in 2008. These firms reduced share repurchases (relative
to 2007 levels) by an amount representing about one-tenth of the debt due. And re-
ductions in their inventories accounted for another 7% of the 2008-maturing debt.
Given executives’ strong aversion to cutting dividends (see Brav, Graham, Harvey,
and Michaely (2005)), it is perhaps not surprising that dividend cuts during 2008
accounted for only 1% of the amount of debt due for the treated firms. The remain-
ing 29% is explained by other factors (such as reductions in R&D, labor costs, asset
sales, and perhaps limited issuance of securities).31
While admittedly done solely for purposes of providing a crude approximation
for how the treated firms responded to the financial crisis, the numbers depicted in
31Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) survey 574 U.S. CFOs at the end of 2008, asking man-
agers about the measures they adopt to cope with the credit crisis. The managers in their survey
report cuts of 11% in their firms’ R&D expenditures and another 4% in their work force. More-
over, nearly 50% of the CFOs surveyed say that they sold assets in 2008 to cope with the credit
squeeze.
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Figure 5 fits our economic intuition very well. In particular, the figure suggests that
firms that were burdened with large amounts of maturing debt in 2008 drew heav-
ily on their least costly sources of funds (such as cash holdings) in order to mitigate
the effects of maturing debt, but had to ultimately cut back on real activities, such
as investment spending.
1.5.2 Longer-Term Consequences of Re-Financing
Constraints
Our empirical analysis evaluates the consequences of the August 2007 panic over
the period that immediately follows that event (the first three quarters of 2008).
We do so according to the design of our identification strategy. However, it is nat-
ural to wonder if the financing effects we identified had long-term impacts on firm
welfare. While a complete analysis of the long-term consequences of debt maturity
structure is beyond the scope of our paper, we investigate the longer-term impli-
cations of our experiment’s “treatment” on firm welfare up until June 2010. For
simplicity, we do so using graphical analysis.
Our baseline investigation revolves around investment spending. While Table 3
describes the investment of treated and control firms over the first three quarters
of 2008, we now examine how those firms invested beyond that time. Panel A of
Figure 6 depicts the longer-term investment effects of our 2008-maturing debt treat-
ment over the entire financial crisis (up to summer 2010). The figure shows that
by the end of 2008 (following Lehman’s failure) investment-to-asset ratios dropped
across all firms; both treated and control firms.32 By the summer of 2009, both
firm-types were investing at similar levels. After hitting a bottom (at roughly 50%
of pre-crisis levels), investment starts growing again in the first half of 2010; and if
anything, treated firms rebound more rapidly in 2010. The patterns in the graph
suggest that debt maturity structure created an investment wedge between firms
during the initial phases of the crisis. As the crisis deepened, however, that wedge
softened, as all firms in the economy implemented drastic spending cuts.
We also look at firm operating performance over the August 2007–June 2010
period. The time-series of the ratio of operating income to total assets is depicted
in Panel B of Figure 6. The figure shows that firms with debt maturing in 2008
had inferior operating performance up until the third quarter of 2008. Following
Lehman’s failure, all firms observe drastic declines in operating income. Treated
32As discussed above, our baseline tests avoided data from the fourth quarter of 2008 to
sidestep the effects of the Lehman debacle and the deepening of the aggregate recession.
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and control firms observed roughly similar operating income in the first quarter of
2009. Since then, both firm-types show improvements in their performance. Yet,
firms affected by a re-financing constraint in 2008 (treated firms) seem to underper-
form somewhat those that did not face that constraint.
To sum up, the debt re-financing constraints that we use to identify our tests
seem to have significant effects on firm investment and operating performance in
the first three quarters of 2008 (our treatment window). As the financial crisis deep-
ened, however, all firms in our sample seem to be engulfed by the adverse circum-
stances of the aggregate economy. By early 2009, treated and control firms seem to
have similar behaviors (just like they had in August 2007, when we defined their
“pairings”) and appear to respond roughly similarly to developments in the econ-
omy (but with some identifiable differences). The extension of this section provides
additional economic context to the connections between financial contracting and
real outcomes that our tests identify.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
We use the August 2007 credit panic to assess the effect of financial contracting on
real corporate policies. In particular, we test whether firms with large fractions of
their long-term debt maturing at the time of the crisis observe more pronounced
negative outcomes than otherwise similar firms whose debt structure is such that
they did not need to refinance a lot of debt during the crisis. Our empirical method-
ology aims at replicating an experiment-like test in which we control for observed
and time-invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity via a difference-in-differences
matching estimator.
We find evidence that the terms of long-term financial contracting can have sig-
nificant implications for firms’ real and financial policies when they face a credit
shock. Firms whose long-term debt was largely maturing right after the third quar-
ter of 2007 cut their quarterly investment rates by 2.5 percentage points more than
otherwise similar firms whose debt was due well after the crisis. This relative de-
crease in investment for firms with maturity “spikes” during the crisis is statisti-
cally significant and economically large (approximately one-third of the pre-crisis
level of investment for these firms). A number of falsification and placebo tests con-
firm our inferences about the effect of credit supply shocks on corporate policies.
Our results contribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, our identi-
fication strategy shows a novel link between debt maturity and corporate invest-
ment. In particular, our results point to the importance of maturity structure for
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corporate financial flexibility. As a matter of corporate policy, our study highlights
the extra attention firm managers should pay to the maturity profile of their firms’
debt. Second, our results provide evidence that the 2007 credit crisis had significant
real effects on corporate behavior in 2008. Third, our evidence suggests that debt
maturity structure is an important variable in understanding how credit supply
shocks spread through the corporate sector — beyond what one can learn by look-
ing at firms’ leverage ratios. Understanding the effects of credit cycles (and credit
crises in particular) is not only of interest for corporate finance researchers, but also
important for economic policymakers. More broadly, our findings provide new evi-
dence that financial contracting has causal effects on real corporate outcomes. Our
study characterizes one precise channel (a contracting feature) that shows how fi-
nancing affects investment.
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1.8 Tables and Figures
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Table 1.1: Characteristics of Treated, Non-Treated, and
Control Firms at the end of 2007
This table compares the properties of treated, non-treated, and control firms (median compar-
isons). The 1,067 sample firms are split into treated and non-treated groups. The treated firms
are defined as those for which the percentage of long-term debt maturing within one year (i.e.,
2008) is greater than 20 percent and non-treated firms are defined as those for which the percent-
age of long-term debt maturing within one year is less than or equal to 20 percent. Control firms
are a subset of the non-treated firms selected as the closest match to the treated firms based on a
set of firm characteristics: Q, cash flow, size, cash holdings, long-term debt normalized by assets,
2-digit SIC industry, and credit ratings. There are 86 treated firms and 86 control firms. The
medians of Q, cash flow, size, cash holdings, and long-term leverage are displayed for the three
samples of firms (treated, non-treated, and controls). The average quarterly investment-to-capital
ratio over the first three quarters of 2007 is also displayed. See text for further variable definitions.
The test for a difference in the medians of a firm characteristic across two groups is conducted by
calculating the continuity-correct Pearson’s χ2 statistic, with the p-values of this test reported at
the bottom row of each panel.
Q Cash Flow Size Cash LT Leverage Investment
Panel A: Medians for Treated and Non-Treated Firms in 2007
Treated 1.728 0.076 5.870 0.080 0.244 0.047
Non-Treated 1.499 0.056 6.784 0.045 0.294 0.047
Difference 0.229 0.020 –0.914 0.035 –0.050 0.000
Median Test
0.005 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.093 0.918
p-value
Panel B: Medians for Treated and Control Firms in 2007
Treated 1.728 0.076 5.870 0.080 0.244 0.047
Control 1.599 0.070 6.266 0.063 0.233 0.051
Difference 0.129 0.006 –0.396 0.017 0.011 –0.003
Median Test
0.286 0.446 0.286 0.879 0.647 0.879
p-value
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Table 1.2: Distributional Tests of Treated, Non-Treated, and
Control Firms at the end of 2007
This table compares distributional properties of the various matching covariates of treated, non-
treated, and control firms. The 1,067 sample firms are split into treated and non-treated groups.
The treated firms are defined as those for which the percentage of long-term debt maturing
within one year (i.e., 2008) is greater than 20 percent and non-treated firms are defined as those
for which the percentage of long-term debt maturing within one year is less than or equal to 20
percent. Control firms are a subset of the non-treated firms selected as the closest match to the
treated firms based on a set of firm characteristics: Q, cash flow, size, cash holdings, long-term
debt normalized by assets, 2-digit SIC industry, and credit ratings. There are 86 treated firms
and 86 control firms. The medians of Q, cash flow, size, cash holdings, and long-term leverage are
displayed for the three samples of firms (treated, non-treated, and controls). The average quar-
terly investment-to-capital ratio over the first three quarters of 2007 is also displayed. See text
for further variable definitions. The 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile are reported for
each firm characteristic. The test for differences in the distribution of a firm characteristic across
two groups is conducted by calculating the corrected Kolmogorov-Smirnov’s D-statistic, with the
p-values of this test reported in the rightmost column.
25th % Median 75th %
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Test p-value
Panel A: Characteristics of Treated vs. Non-Treated Firms in 2007
Q Treated 1.341 1.728 2.305 0.006
Non-Treated 1.185 1.499 2.081
Cash Flow Treated 0.033 0.076 0.150 0.013
Non-Treated 0.026 0.056 0.116
Size Treated 4.320 5.870 7.640 0.000
Non-Treated 5.730 6.784 7.883
Cash Treated 0.021 0.080 0.184 0.005
Non-Treated 0.017 0.045 0.126
LT Leverage Treated 0.159 0.244 0.356 0.096
Non-Treated 0.186 0.294 0.427
Investment Treated 0.027 0.047 0.095 0.365
Non-Treated 0.027 0.047 0.082
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Table 1.2 (cont.)
25th % Median 75th %
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Test p-value
Panel B: Characteristics of Treated vs. Control Firms in 2007
Q Treated 1.341 1.728 2.305 0.160
Control 1.263 1.599 2.063
Cash Flow Treated 0.033 0.076 0.150 0.676
Control 0.043 0.070 0.124
Size Treated 4.320 5.870 7.640 0.676
Control 4.549 6.266 7.237
Cash Treated 0.021 0.080 0.184 0.416
Control 0.019 0.063 0.161
LT Leverage Treated 0.159 0.244 0.356 0.977
Control 0.154 0.233 0.341
Investment Treated 0.027 0.047 0.095 0.915
Control 0.028 0.051 0.091
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Table 1.3: Difference-in-Differences of Firm Investment Be-
fore and After the Fall 2007 Credit Crisis with a
Placebo Test Conducted a Year Before the Credit
Crisis
Panel A and Panel B of this table present estimates of the change in average quarterly investment
rates from the first three quarters of 2007 to the first three quarters of 2008 (before and after the
fall 2007 credit crisis). Panel C presents an estimate of the change in investment from the first
three quarters of 2006 to the first three quarters of 2007 (a placebo test conducted before the
credit crisis). In Panel A, the average of quarterly investment during the first three quarters of
2008 and the first three quarters of 2007 is calculated for the treated firms and non-treated firms,
as well as the difference in the difference between the two groups of firms over the two years. The
average quarterly investment is normalized by the capital stock at the preceding quarter; that is,
by lagged property, plant, and equipment. The treated firms are defined as those for which the
percentage of long-term debt maturing within one year (i.e., 2008) is greater than 20 percent and
non-treated firms are defined as those for which the percentage of long-term debt maturing within
one year is less than or equal to 20 percent. There are 86 treated firms and 981 non-treated firms
in Panel A. In Panel B, the average of quarterly investment during the first three quarters of 2008
and the first three quarters of 2007 is calculated for the treated firms and control firms, as well
as the difference in the difference between the two groups of firms over the two years. Control
firms are a subset of the non-treated firms selected as the closest match to the treated firms based
on a set of firm characteristics: Q, cash flow, size, cash holdings, long-term debt normalized by
assets, 2-digit SIC industry, and credit ratings. There are 86 treated firms and 86 control firms
in Panel B. Panel C is constructed analogously, but the tests are conducted one year earlier (be-
fore the credit crisis). There are 113 treated firms and 113 control firms in Panel B. ATT is the
Abadie-Imbens bias corrected average treated effect matching estimator (Matching Estimator).
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
Average Quarterly Investment / Capital Stock
(in percentage points)
Panel A: Investment Before and After the Fall 2007 Credit Crisis
Investment in 2008 (Q1 to Q3) vs. Investment in 2007 (Q1 to Q3)
2007 2008 2008 – 2007
Treated Firms 7.83*** 5.70*** –2.13**
(0.89) (0.50) (0.84)
Non-Treated Firms 6.54*** 5.98*** –0.56***
(0.20) (0.16) (0.18)
Difference 1.29 –0.28 –1.57*
(0.91) (0.53) (0.85)
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Table 1.3 (cont.)
Average Quarterly Investment / Capital Stock
(in percentage points)
Panel B: Investment Before and After the Fall 2007 Credit Crisis
Investment in 2008 (Q1 to Q3) vs. Investment in 2007 (Q1 to Q3)
2007 2008 2008 – 2007
Treated Firms 7.83*** 5.70*** –2.13**
(0.89) (0.50) (0.84)
Control Firms 7.26*** 7.35*** 0.09
(0.70) (0.64) (0.71)
Difference 0.57 –1.65*** –2.21**
(0.96) (0.62) (1.01)
Matching Estimator –2.46**
(ATT) (1.07)
Panel C: The Placebo Test
Investment in 2007 (Q1 to Q3) vs. Investment in 2006 (Q1 to Q3)
2006 2007 2007 – 2006
Treated Firms 7.27*** 6.86*** –0.41
(0.63) (0.65) (0.72)
Control Firms 7.17*** 6.89*** –0.28
(0.76) (0.66) (0.84)
Difference 0.10 –0.03 –0.13
(0.84) (0.79) (1.02)
Matching Estimator 0.01
(ATT) (1.09)
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
45
Table 1.4: Value Analysis During the Outcome Period for
Treated, Control, and Non-Treated Firms
This table presents value analysis for the first three quarters of 2008, which our tests define as
outcome period. The treated firms are defined as those for which the percentage of long-term
debt maturing within one year (i.e., 2008) is greater than 20 percent and non-treated firms are
defined as those for which the percentage of long-term debt maturing within one year is less than
or equal to 20 percent. Control firms are the closest matches to the treated firms based on a set
of firm characteristics (see the description in Table 1.3 for details). We examine two variables:
the total stock market return, and the percentage change in Q with respect to the end of 2007.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
Return Q
Treated –28.97*** –19.20***
(3.62) (2.27)
Control –18.16*** –14.11***
(3.23) (2.08)
Non-Treated –20.55*** –12.86***
(1.01) (0.63)
Difference –10.81** –5.09*
Treated – Control (4.85) (3.06)
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 1.5: Difference-in-Differences of Firm Investment from
One Year to the Next: 2001 through 2007
This table presents an estimate of the change in investment from the first three quarters of a
given year to the first three quarters of the next year. The first row replicates the Difference-in-
Differences and Matching Estimator (ATT) from Panel B of Table 3 and the second row replicates
the Difference-in-Differences and Matching Estimator (ATT) from Panel C of Table 3. Analo-
gous results are then presented for the other years. The treated firms are defined as those for
which the percentage of long-term debt maturing within one year is greater than 20 percent and
control firms are defined as those for which the percentage of long-term debt maturing within
one year is less than or equal to 20 percent. Control firms are the closest matches to the treated
firms based on a set of firm characteristics (see the description in Table 3 for details). ATT is the
Abadie-Imbens bias-corrected average treated effect matching estimator (Matching Estimator).
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
Difference in the change in
Investment Change investment between treated Matching Estimator (ATT)
and control firms
(in percentage points) (in percentage points)
2008 – 2007 –2.21** –2.46**
(1.01) (1.07)
2007 – 2006 –0.13 0.01
(1.02) (1.09)
2006 – 2005 0.17 0.15
(1.00) (0.96)
2005 – 2004 –0.70 –0.54
(0.50) (0.50)
2004 – 2003 0.28 0.20
(0.49) (0.52)
2003 – 2002 0.21 0.30
(0.54) (0.54)
2002 – 2001 0.22 0.57
(0.87) (0.90)
Pooled Analysis: All Years –0.10 –0.04
Before Fall 2007 Credit Crisis (0.30) (0.31)
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 1.6: Trends in Investment for Treated and Control
Firms: Mean and Median Comparisons
This table reports the mean and median quarterly change in investment for firms in the treatment
and control groups going back many years prior to the fourth quarter of 2007. The first row in the
table reports statistics for changes in investment going back two years prior to the crisis (quarterly
investment changes from 2005Q3 through 2007Q3). A similar calculation is reported in the second
row of the table, but the data goes back three years prior to the 2007 crisis quarter (starting in
2004Q3). Subsequent rows go back farther in time at larger increments. The table also reports
p-values associated with test statistics for differences in means (standard t-test) and in medians
(continuity-correct Pearson’s χ2) across groups.
Treatment Control P -Value of Difference
Mean Mean t-test
Time Horizon [Median] [Median] [Pearson χ2]
(in percentage points)
2 years prior to 2007Q4 –0.11 –0.42 0.60
[0.07] [0.05] [0.99]
3 years prior to 2007Q4 –0.20 –0.16 0.93
[0.03] [0.10] [0.47]
4 years prior to 2007Q4 –0.07 –0.10 0.94
[0.05] [0.11] [0.55]
5 years prior to 2007Q4 –0.19 -0.06 0.70
[0.04] [0.11] [0.45]
10 years prior to 2007Q4 –0.21 –0.18 0.89
[0.03] [0.03] [0.92]
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Table 1.7: Difference-in-Differences of Firm Investment Be-
fore and After the Fall 2007 Credit Crisis: Differ-
ent Cutoffs for the ratio of Long-Term Debt Due
in 2008 to Total Long-Term Debt
This table presents estimates of the change in investment from the first three quarters of 2007
to the first three quarters of 2008 for alternative treatment-assignment cutoffs for the proportion
of long-term debt due in 2008 to total long-term debt: (1) more than 15%, (2) more than 20%,
and (3) more than 25%. The benchmark case result (from Panel B of Table 3) is presented in
the middle column for ease of comparison. Control firms are the closest matches to the treated
firms based on a set of firm characteristics (see the description in Table 3 for details). ATT is the
Abadie-Imbens bias-corrected average treated effect matching estimator (Matching Estimator).
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
Long-Term Debt Long-Term Debt Long-Term Debt
Due in 2008 > 15% Due in 2008 > 20% Due in 2008 > 25%
Change in Investment –1.72*** –2.13** –2.81**
for Treated Firms (0.62) (0.84) (1.14)
Change in Investment –0.27 0.09 0.56
for Control Firms (0.56) (0.71) (0.91)
Difference –1.45* –2.21** –3.37**
(0.76) (1.01) (1.34)
Matching Estimator –1.34* –2.46** –3.71***
(ATT) (0.76) (1.07) (1.40)
Firms in Treatment 129 86 62
Group
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 1.8: Difference-in-Differences of Firm Investment Be-
fore and After the Fall 2007 Credit Crisis: Differ-
ent Cutoffs for Long-Term Leverage Ratio
This table presents estimates of the change in investment from the first three quarters of 2007
to the first three quarters of 2008 for alternative cutoffs for the ratio of debt due in more than
one year to total assets: (1) more than 0%, (2) more than 5%, and (3) more than 10%. The
benchmark case result (from Panel B of Table 3) is presented in the middle column for ease of
comparison. Control firms are the closest matches to the treated firms based on a set of firm char-
acteristics (see the description in Table 3 for details). ATT is the Abadie-Imbens bias-corrected
average treated effect matching estimator (Matching Estimator). Heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors are in parentheses.
Long-Term Long-Term Long-Term
Leverage > 0% Leverage > 5% Leverage > 10%
Change in Investment –1.09* –2.13** –2.72**
for Treated Firms (0.62) (0.84) (1.18)
Change in Investment –1.09* 0.09 –0.54
for Control Firms (0.49) (0.71) (1.02)
Difference –0.01 –2.21** –2.19
(0.73) (1.01) (1.49)
Matching Estimator 0.23 –2.46** –3.38**
(ATT) (0.78) (1.07) (1.33)
Firms in Treatment 236 86 64
Group
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Figure 1.1: LIBOR and Commercial Paper (CP) Spreads
During the 2007-2009 Credit Crisis
This figure displays the 3-month LIBOR and commercial paper (CP) spreads over
comparable-maturity treasuries, for the period of January 2004 to August 2009. The
data is from http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/.
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Figure 1.2: Corporate Bond Spreads During the 2007 Credit
Crisis
This figure displays the time series of spreads for indices of investment-grade and high-
yield bonds from January 2004 to August 2009. The data are from Citigroup’s Yield-
book. The investment-grade index is Citigroup’s BIG CORP index, which included
only corporate bonds and has an average credit quality of A. The high–yield bond in-
dex is Citigroup’s HY MARKET index, which has an average credit quality equal to
B+. The spreads are calculated with respect to the 5-year treasury rate (data from
http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/.)
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Figure 1.3: Composition of Long-Term Debt Maturity at the
end of 2007
This figure displays the proportion (%) of long-term debt maturing in the years of 2008,
2009, 2010, 2010, 2011, and 2012 for our sample firms. Maturity structure is measured at
the end of the 2007 fiscal year. As an example, the squares with the letter “T” indicate
the proportion of long-term debt that is maturing for Dollar-Thrifty (a treated firm) for
each year between 2008 and 2012. The squares with the letter “C” represent the long-
term debt maturity structure for Dollar-Thrifty’s control match: Avis-Budget. At the end
of 2007, Dollar’s (Avis’s) long-term debt maturity structure in the next five years is as
follows: 34% (1%) due in 2008, 0% (7%) due in 2009, 19% (17%) due in 2010, 19% (11%)
due in 2011, 19% (26%) due in 2012. The remainder of those companies’ long-term debt
was scheduled to mature in years beyond 2012.
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Figure 1.4: Composition of Long-Term Debt Maturity: 1999
to 2006
This figure displays the amount of long-term debt maturing in one to five years away
from an initial year t, as a fraction of total long-term debt, for the sample of firms de-
scribed in Section 2.3. Maturity structure is measured at the end of fiscal year t,with t
varying from 1999 to 2006.
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Figure 1.4 (cont.)
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Figure 1.5: How did Treated Firms Pay Off Their Debt?
This figure displays changes in policy variables from the first three quarters of 2007 to
the first three quarters of 2008, as a fraction of the amount of long-term debt maturing in
2008, for the sample of 77 treated firms for which we have complete data on investment,
cash holdings, cash dividends, inventories, and share repurchases. Treated firms are those
which have more than 20% of their long-term debt maturing in 2008.
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Figure 1.6: Longer-Term Consequences of Re-Financing
Constraints
These figures display the time-series evolution of investment spending and operating
income for treated and control firms over the September 2007–June 2010 window. In-
vestment is the quarterly ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Operating income is the
quarterly ratio of operating income to assets.
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Chapter 2
How do Institutional Investors
Select IPO stocks?
2.1 Introduction
“If you don’t know the horse, you can bet the jockey” - Anonymous
When a firm wants to go public, it needs to hire an underwriter to manage the
Initial Public Offering process. A question that arises is how the firm chooses the
lead underwriter to manage the issue. Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2001) and
Brau and Fawcett (2006) address this question in a survey among selected issuers.
Although there are differences in the survey population of the two papers, they
both have the same conclusions with respect to the variables an issuer finds rel-
evant when choosing the lead underwriter. Notably, institutional investors client
base of the underwriter are among the top four characteristics.
Issuers may want to have institutional investors among shareholders for many
relevant reasons. One argument is that institutional and wealthy investors are bet-
ter able to buy large blocks of IPO shares. According to Gompers and Metrick
(2001), institutional investors held control over more than half of the U.S. equity
market in December 1996. Thus, an IPO that does not reach for institutional in-
vestor might have problems raising the desired amount of funds. Moreover, it is
sometimes felt that having the support of large institutions as shareholders can give
the IPO companies the necessary power for future capital raising exercises. Insti-
tutional and high net worth investors also tend to have longer investment horizons
and can therefore be expected to provide greater price stability to the IPO counter.
A question that issuers naturally ask is how they can attract institutional in-
vestors during an Initial Public Offering. The main goal of this paper is to answer
this question. We ask how institutional investors pick IPO stocks. Among the most
important results, we show that the reputation of the underwriter (or pool of un-
derwriters) is the most significant variable in the institutional investors‘ decision
to buy a new issue, and this explanatory power persists after controlling for other
characteristics of the offer and for performance characteristics of the issuer. More
specifically, a one-point increase in the ranking of the underwriter leads to nearly a
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2% increase in the allocation among institutional investors. The result is in accor-
dance with the certification theory, described by Beatty and Ritter (1986). In other
words, the importance of the underwriter is to reduce the asymmetric information
between investors and the issuing firm. Reputable underwriters have no incentive to
bring bad companies to the market since these underwriters have reputable capital
at stake.
It is also important to describe what kind of certification the underwriter pro-
vides. This is the second question we address in this paper. The underwriter can
be functioning as a certifier for uncertainties related to the financial health of the
firm or its track record. A private firm is not under strong surveillance of the mar-
ket and it might be hard to get a sense of how good the investment might be just
looking at some financial statements disclosed at the time of the IPO. This hypoth-
esis would be correct if we believe that information contained in financial statement
can predict future performance. Abarbanell and Bushee (1997 and 1998), Wahlen
and Wieland (2007) and Jegadeesh and al. (2004) find that strategies that select
stocks based on specific accounting ratios generate abnormal returns. Given data
constraints for IPO stocks, we will explore the power of some of the variables high-
lighted in these papers. Nonetheless, earnings, assets and liabilities might not say
much about a new public firm to prospective investors. In the survey among insti-
tutional investors in Britain, Jenkinson and Jones (2007) report that only 19% of
the respondents say that they never build a valuation model and only 25% of in-
vestors always build their own model. A second hypothesis is that the underwriter
certifies a non-measurable characteristic. These characteristics might range from
how good is the core business of the firm to how talented are the managers of the
firm. In this same survey, Jenkinson and Jones reports that 1-on-1 meetings with
management are the most effective way to form a view on valuation, compared to
sell-side meetings and the road-show. We find evidence that supports the second
hypothesis.
The literature about underwriter reputation dates back to the 1980s. Booth
and Smith (1986) and Carter and Manaster (1990) were the first papers to show
that the use of a top investment bank to manage the issue is a strong positive sig-
nal to mitigate the uncertainty regarding the quality of the firm among investors.
Nonetheless, this reputation provided by the top investment banks is not free. Al-
though Chen and Ritter (2000) demonstrated that underwriting fees are very simi-
lar among reputable and non-reputable underwriters, the costs for the issuing firm
associated with reputable underwriters is related to the amount of money left on
the table, i.e., the difference between the closing price on the first day of trade and
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the offer price, multiplied by the number of shares offered. Beatty and Welch (1996)
and Kumar and al. (1998) showed that prestigious underwriters underprice more
relatively to less prestigious underwriters. So if a prestigious underwriter actually
does a worse job in valuating the firm, how does such an underwriter provide a pos-
itive signal about the firm? The answer is that the service provided by an under-
writer is not only about valuation and pricing. There has been an increasing rele-
vance to the work provided by an underwriter after the offer, such as market mak-
ing and, most important, research coverage. Krigman and al. (2001) finds that one
of the most important reasons to switch underwriters in a SEO is to buy additional
and influential analyst coverage from the new underwriter. Nonetheless, this ana-
lyst coverage benefit might loose effectiveness in the future, since recommendations
by underwriter analyst show significant evidence of bias, as shown by Michaely and
Womack (1999). Our contribution in this front is to show how important is the un-
derwriter reputation in attracting institutional investor, a concern which is highly
ranked among issuers in their decision about which underwriter to choose. To this
end, we study how institutional investors choose IPOs.
Gompers and Metrick (2001) analyze the characteristics that institutional in-
vestors look in stocks. The authors find that institutions show a strong demand for
large, liquid stocks that have low past returns. Nonetheless, this methodology can-
not be applied to Initial Public Offerings since most of the variables the paper uses
are unavailable for a firm which has never traded before. For example, momentum
variables, volatility, dividend yield, turnover, market capitalization and S&P 500
affiliation are not applicable to new issues.
Field and Lowry (2005) include offer characteristics to try to explain institu-
tional holdings of stocks. Nevertheless, as highlighted by the authors, they are only
interested in voluntary post- IPO holdings by each institution, as opposed to initial
allocations that institutions receive. Thus, the collect institutional holdings at least
one month after the IPO.
Thus, my paper is unique in the sense that it is the first to analyze how insti-
tutional investors invest in Initial Public Offerings, using only information avail-
able before the IPO; i.e., information institutions could use in deciding about their
investments. I consider information regarding the offer, as well as information in-
cluded in the financial statements of the firm, which is included in the Form S-1
that firms need to file in the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) to become pub-
lic.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data and our method-
ology. Section 2.3 presents our empirical results. Section 2.4 examines the evidences
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supporting the two hypotheses raised in the introduction. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data and Methodology
The dataset is composed of firms that went public between 1980 and 2007. I collect
data from different sources. The source of information about the IPO characteris-
tics is the Securities Data Company (SDC) New Issues Database. Following the lit-
erature, I exclude financial firms (SIC codes from 6000 to 6999), ADRs (American
Depositary Receipts) issued by foreign firms and listed in at least one other mar-
ket outside the U.S., REITS (real state investment trusts) and firms with offer price
below five dollars. From the SDC, we collect the issue date, the offer price, the pro-
ceeds from selling the shares in the IPO, whether the issue is venture backed or not,
the file range and the underwriter (or underwriters)‘ s name. Furthermore, we cal-
culate a measure for shares overhang, which is the ratio of total shares outstanding
and primary shares offered.
The data on Institutional Investors holdings are collect from Thompson Finan-
cial 13f Institutions Database. Since 1978, an amendment to the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934 required all institutions with more than $100 million of secu-
rities under discretionary management to report their holdings of common stock
positions greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 every quarter. I use the first re-
port on holdings within first 40 days of the IPO as our proxy for the IPO alloca-
tion. For robustness check, a cutoff of 3 months is also presented, since many firms
have not yet file a report within 40 days (results are not significantly changed). The
rationale for the 40 days cutoff is that this holding report is extremely likely to rep-
resent the real IPO allocation. The quiet period after the IPO, when members of
the underwriting syndicate cannot produce research about the firm, lasts for 40
days. Moreover, in the initial 40 days, underwriters provide price stabilization for
the stock. Thus, if institutional investors want to flip its allocation, the underwriter
will likely be aware of the flipping and it can heavily penalize the institution with
a reduction of allocation of hot IPOs in the future. Presumably, the incentives and
rationale to flip within these 40 days are much reduced for institutional investors.
Table 1 provides the number of IPO, the average amount raised in the offer, and
the average percentage of institutional investor ‘s ownership for the two different
cutoffs, 40 days and 3 months. It is important to note that the reported percent-
age of institutional investor allocation is a lower bound for the real number, since
institutions with a holding below a certain threshold are not required to report
the holding of that particular stock. We will explain better this rule in the section
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where we describe the data.
As it can be noticed looking at the Table 1, we loose a significant amount of
data reducing the cutoff from 3 months to 40 days. Thus, although 40 days is our
primary cutoff, we will also present results for the 3 months cutoff as a robustness
check in our analysis.
Our main source of information about the financial statement variables is the
Fundamentals Quarterly Database of COMPUSTAT North America. From this
database, I collect variables that allow me to calculate the most fundamental fi-
nancial ratios and variables. I calculate the most common ratios investors use to
infer about a firm’s future performance: debt to equity ratio, working capital over
assets, sales over assets, liabilities over assets and price earnings ratio. As I am in-
terested in the information available to investors before the IPO date, only firms
with quarterly financial reports at least 21 days before the IPO date are considered.
I choose the three weeks window so I can be sure that the information contained in
this report has already been disclosed to investors. Moreover, we also exclude firms
that the latest financial report before the IPO is more than 111 days (one quarter
and 3 weeks) before the IPO date. This cleaning reduces dramatically the number
of IPOs in our sample, but it is a necessary measure to guarantee that the financial
report we consider is a true snapshot of the firm at the moment of the IPO.
I use the Carter - Manaster underwriter‘s reputation rankings. Carter and Man-
aster (1990) and Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) ranks underwriters based on the
position in Initial Public Offerings‘ tombstone announcements. Jay Ritter updates
the ranking until 2004 and I use the rankings provided by Jay Ritter in his website.
The ranking is divided in 4 periods, from 1980 to 1984, from 1985 to 19991, from
1992 to 2000 and from 2001 to 2004. When an IPO has more than one lead under-
writer, we assign the underwriter ‘s rank for that IPO as the average of the ranks of
all the lead underwriters. There are 1,110 different underwriters in the sample from
1980 to 2004.
Jay Ritter’s website is also the source for the data on the age of the firms at the
moment of the IPO. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the valid observations
that remain after all the sample cleaning described below, for cutoffs of 40 days and
3 months.
As we can see in Table 2, the financial report variables present a very disperse
distribution, with ratios that seem very different from the same ratios calculated
from a standard established firms from Compustat. Thus, it might be hard to in-
vestors to build a valuation model or any systematic way to assess the firm‘s poten-
tial based on these accounting ratios. Although I did no report in the table, I use
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a simple two-way t test and the mean from the two cutoffs are not significant dif-
ferent for any variable, with the exception of institutional ownership, but still not
even at a 1% level. It is important to notice that share overhang has many missing
values compared to the other variables from the IPO deal. We will consider this in
our regression analysis, so we do not miss many observations, which could possibly
bias our results.
The methodology applied in this paper uses variables that the literature has es-
tablished as those related to IPO outcomes, mostly to underpricing, which is the
topic most explored in the literature. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss
each variable used and the rationale behind its use. I use proceeds amount to con-
trol for the size of the offer. Reputable investment banks are usually the big ones,
those that have many clients and a broad network. Thus, it is reasonable to think
that a powerhouse will necessarily manage a big issue in the underwriting busi-
ness. As I am interested in isolating the effect of the reputation on institutional
investors’s allocation of the issue, controlling for the size of the offer is essential.
There is a large literature that deals with the effect of Venture Capital presence
in Initial Public Offerings. This literature started with the Megginson and Weiss
(1991), showing that venture capital backing results in significantly lower initial re-
turns and gross spreads, compared with a control group of firms without venture
backing. Barry, Muscarella, Peavy and Vetsuypens (1990) and Gompers and Lerner
(1997) challenges these results, about the certification role of venture capitalist,
with conflicting evidence. Nonetheless, it is important to consider the influence of
venture capital backing if one wants to have a serious conclusion about the influ-
ence of underwriters ‘s reputation in the allocation of Initial Public Offerings.
The literature has already showed the importance of the partial adjustment
phenomenon. Partial Adjustment is defined as the offer price minus the middle of
the original file range, divided by the middle of the original file range. According
to Bradley and Jordan (2002), offer prices above the middle of the file range are
more likely to present a higher underpricing. Nonetheless, we need to be concern
with the use of the partial adjustment phenomenon in analyzing institutional allo-
cation of IPO stocks. As Jenkinson, Morrison and Wilhelm (2005) points out, when
investment bankers compete for the lead underwriter position in an IPO, a very de-
sirable advantage is to report verbal commitments by large institutional investors
willing to buy the issue. Therefore, to maintain a good relationship with the un-
derwriter so the investor can benefit from future hot IPOs, this investor might find
himself constrained to change his commitments late in the process, when the offer
price is disclosed and one can calculate the partial adjustment in that particular
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offer.
It is also important to consider the effect of share overhang in the behavior of
institutional investor investments in Initial Public Offerings. I define share over-
hang as the ratio of shares outstanding after the offer to primary shares offered.
Share overhang has already been explored in the literature of IPO undepricing.
Bradley and Jordan (2002) reports that IPOs with greater share overhang are more
underpriced than issues with smaller degrees of overhang. The rationale is that
firms with a high overhang are less concerned with the valuation of the shares, since
an increase in the price after the offer will benefit the insiders. In what concerns
our analysis of institutional investors holdings, a high share overhang means that
the firm is offering a small portion of corporate control. If institutional investors
are interested in exercise some kind of supervision due to the high amount of in-
vestment in the firm, a high share overhang is an undesirable characteristic of the
Initial Public Offering.
I also include the age of the issuing firm as a variable in our analysis. In their
analysis of underpricing changes over time, Loughran and Ritter (2004) finds that
age is a significant variable in most of their multiple regression analysis. Age can be
an important factor in an IPO for institutional investors, if one believes that insti-
tutional investors prefer more mature firms. Gompers and Metrick (2001) support
this view, as we have already pointed in the introduction. The difference with re-
spect to out analysis is that they calculate age as the time since the IPO, and we
use age as the time since the foundation of the firm.
Now I turn to the discussion of the variables I consider to describe the finan-
cial situation of the firm. I use the most popular ratios investors calculate from
information on financial statements and then use to evaluate a company.1 There
is no clear theory about how a certain ratio might influence the future prospects
of the firm, but it is safe to state that these ratios are taken in consideration. For
instance, any equity research report includes these ratios along with their written
analysis of the stock. Moreover, there is a large literature about the impact of fi-
nancial statement disclosures on stock price. The paper is not concern with the di-
rection of the impact of a particular ratio. We try to take conclusions about the
overall significance of the financial information on the institutional investors ‘s deci-
sion about the issuing company.
1Debt to Equity Ratio = Total Liabilities / Shareholders, Equity Inventory Turnover Ratio =
Cost of Sales / Average Inventory for the period, Operating Margin = Income from Operation /
Net Revenues, P /E ratio = Price per Share / Earnings per Share, Revenues to Assets Ratio =
Total Revenues / Total Assets, Liabilities to Assets Ratio = Total Liabilities / Total Assets.
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2.3 Empirical Results
To study how institutional investors select Initial Public Offerings, I will apply a
multivariate regression analysis that includes the two types of variables discussed
above. Table 3 shows the results for the regression analysis considering two spec-
ifications, with and without the variables collected in the financial reports. For
robustness check, I run the same regressions for the 40 days cutoff and for the 3
months cutoff. The main reason to report the results for the 3 months period is to
verify the consistent of the results, since the sample size for the 3 months cutoff is
more than 3 times larger than the sample size for the 40 days cutoff. The main re-
sults are very similar. I will discuss the regression results for the 40 days cutoff.
As we can see in Table 3, in every specification, the rank of the underwriters is
significant at 1% level and one interprets it in the following way: a one point in-
crease in the underwriter rank increases the allocation to institutional investors
in almost 2%. This is a 10% increase relatively to the average institutional own-
ership. The proceeds amount is significant at 5% level and it presents the direc-
tion one would expect from the theory. Big investment banks manage larger issues.
Although not significant, age and overhang presents the directions one would ex-
pect from the theory and previous empirical papers. In accordance with Gompers
and Metrick (2001), institutional investors seem to have a greater appetite for older
firms. As the agency theory would predict, institutional investors’ value less those
issues in which they will exert less control over management. The partial adjust-
ment variable is negative and significant. This result is hard to interpret. A pos-
itive partial adjustment might be caused by an expected surge in retail investors‘
demand. Thus, given everything else equal, some institutional investors might loose
interest in the stock due to this price revision. The financial report variables are
not significant, with the exception of liabilities over assets. But we need to be care-
ful in inferring any conclusion from this single significant result. When we run the
same regression for the 3 months cutoff, we don’t find any significance in that vari-
able.
One might suspect that our results are driven by another variable, such as the
firm’s riskness. Underwriters might be able to assess firm’s riskness and reputable
underwriters will only underwrite low risk firms. Thus, our finding about the rank
variable is nothing but a preference for less riskier firms by institutional investors.
To clarify this issue, we calculate the daily volatility of the stock price as a proxy
for the idiosyncratic risk of the firm. Although significant and negative, volatility
seems to be orthogonal to the reputation effect, since it did not decrease the ex-
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planatory power of the rank coefficient.
In summary, our results show the clear importance of the reputation of the un-
derwriter in the institutional investors‘ decision to buy an Initial Public Offering, as
predicted by the certification hypothesis. Thus, our first empirical question is an-
swered and now we turn to the question of the type of this certification. In other
words, is the underwriter certifying a measurable or non-measurable characteristic?
2.4 Type of Certification
Having proved the importance of the underwriter certification role in an IPO, we
not investigate the type of this certification. If the underwriter is certifying some
measurable financial characteristics, we should start to find some significance in the
financial statement variables in their role in explaining institutional investor prefer-
ences for stocks in the years after the IPO, as well as a decrease in the explanatory
power of the underwriter‘s rank. If the certification story has nothing to do with
financial statement variables and it is a certification for some un-measurable char-
acteristics, such as management quality or how good is the idea, we should continue
to see results similar to the ones found in the previous section, i.e., the underwriter
rank is still the dominant variable in explaining how institutional investors select
stocks.
We test these hypotheses analyzing the same set of firms at the moment of the
IPO and 1 and 2 years after the IPO, with the cutoff of 40 days for the first ob-
servation of Institutional Investors‘ holdings. If the measurable characteristics hy-
pothesis is correct, we expect some increase in the significance of the financial state-
ment variables after 1 and 2 years and a decrease in explanatory power of the rank
of the underwriter. That is, assuming that investors always allocate funds in the
most promising stocks, why would the choice of underwriter affect the holdings of a
particular stock one or two years after the IPO? It is important to emphasize that
the underwriter’s obligation to provide research coverage for the new public stock
is not eternal and the market-making obligation does not last more than a couple
of months in most cases. On the other hand, if the un-measurable characteristics
hypothesis is correct, we expect that the underwriter rank continue to be the most
relevant variable in explaining institutional investors ‘ holdings. We make sure that
the firms in the regression analysis at the moment of the IPO are the same as the
firms in the regression analysis 1 year or 2 years after the IPO. Table 4 provides
summary statistics.
With this extra cleaning, we don’t loose many observations compared to Panel
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A of Table 2. The differences in observations for the 1 year and 2 years analysis are
never more than 60 and 170 data points, respectively. To reduce this difference, we
don’t use share overhang in the following regression analysis. In this way, the differ-
ences in observation never exceed 50 data points. Thus, we do not think survival
bias is a major concern in our results. Moreover, even if there was survival bias
in our data, it would affect both hypothesis, and it would not clear bias towards a
specific hypothesis. Table 5 presents our regression analysis. Panel A compares the
firms at the moment of the IPO and 1 year after the IPO and Panel B compares
the firms at the moment of the IPO and 2 years after the IPO.
As we can see in Table 5, the underwriter ‘s rank continues to be the most dom-
inant variable in explaining the decision of the institutional investor to pick an
IPO. Moreover, the coefficient increases. At the moment of the IPO, an one point
increase in underwriter‘s rank increases institutional investor‘s holdings in almost
2%. After one year, this number increases to 3% and after 2 years, this number
increases to 4%. On the other hand, the financial statement variables are not sig-
nificant at all in the regression analysis 1 and 2 years after the IPO. The amount
raised in the offer continues to be significant in explaining institutional investors‘
holding 1 and 2 years after the IPO. On the other hand, partial adjustment looses
its explanatory power in the years after the IPO. As the mean institutional in-
vestors ‘ holding increases after 1 and 2 years of the IPO, these new investors (or
current investors increasing their positions) are not concerned with the partial ad-
justment, as a rational behavior would predict. Age becomes significant at 1% level
in the years after the IPO, in contrast with the results for the IPO moment. This
change is surprising, and we don’t have a good explanation for the phenomenon. To
the sake of our results, the direction is the same, which comfort us. Venture Back-
ing is a result that surprised me as well. It showed a negative relation to institu-
tional investors‘ holding at the IPO moment, but it turned positive and significant
in the years after the IPO. I plan to develop a further analysis in the next versions
of this paper to try to unveil the interpretation behind this result.
In summary, our results support the hypothesis about the non-measurable char-
acteristic certification role of the underwriter. The underwriter certifies some qual-
ity measure of the issuer, which is a characteristic intrinsic to the firm, not only
at the time of the IPO, but 1 and 2 years after the offer. As the underwriter has a
long-term relationship with institutional investors, he has no incentive to certify a
”bad lemon” issuer if he has reputation capital at stake. And institutional investors
need the intermediation of an underwriter since it is a quite obvious that a ”bad
lemon” issues would not reveal itself if asked so by institutional investors.
67
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides support for the certification role of the underwriter in the IPO
process and analyzes how institutional investors pick IPO stocks. The main mes-
sage is that the choice of underwriter is a very important factor in institutional in-
vestors‘ decision to allocate funds in an Initial Public Offering and that reputable
underwriters allocate more shares among institutional investors. Moreover, we find
evidence that institutional investors don‘t guide their investment decision based
on financial statement information for young public firms. In the early years of the
company, it seems that intangible variables are more relevant for the decision to
invest taken by institutional investors.
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Table 2.1: Number of IPOs, Average Amount Raised and
Average Institutional Ownership by Year
IPOs with an offer price below $5.00 per share, financial firms, REITS, ADRs are excluded. Panel
A only reports firms with a 13f Institutional Ownership Report within 40 days of the IPO date.
Panel B only reports firms with a 13f Institutional Ownership Report with 3 months of the IPO
date.
Panel A: 40 Days Cuttoff Panel B: 3 Months Cuttoff
Number Amount Institutional Number Amount Institutional
Year of Raised in Ownership of Raised in Ownership
IPOs the Offer IPOs the Offer
1980 1 299.00 8.89% 17 29.61 9.58%
1981 4 13.53 1.80% 82 14.08 6.57%
1982 2 42.75 5.81% 16 16.86 7.19%
1983 11 50.94 11.30% 123 31.70 11.95%
1984 6 29.40 11.22% 54 19.07 11.39%
1985 38 19.31 14.88% 114 17.86 14.36%
1986 70 50.51 23.68% 225 37.30 18.44%
1987 46 76.25 17.86% 168 45.92 15.72%
1988 19 30.00 18.04% 80 46.55 13.64%
1989 29 62.19 16.62% 85 58.22 18.29%
1990 26 34.55 25.47% 83 40.43 26.62%
1991 68 61.87 21.19% 195 56.65 21.81%
1992 78 88.48 20.24% 209 72.92 23.97%
1993 86 88.98 21.40% 264 66.72 23.89%
1994 69 70.89 19.26% 200 64.50 23.46%
1995 114 63.01 23.07% 294 73.97 23.09%
1996 85 86.38 21.81% 367 72.56 22.99%
1997 143 60.57 20.64% 386 63.37 22.74%
1998 90 88.00 21.04% 237 141.17 22.35%
1999 155 88.41 16.87% 420 121.80 18.48%
2000 104 121.36 17.62% 324 97.27 21.39%
2001 28 564.24 27.21% 68 382.84 29.99%
2002 24 277.54 29.41% 52 208.79 36.35%
2003 23 180.90 31.18% 50 146.18 34.23%
2004 61 124.82 23.93% 149 148.33 28.95%
2005 37 154.74 23.01% 132 181.45 32.12%
2006 56 162.22 24.05% 145 183.27 29.58%
2007* 30 144.60 20.11% 72 179.31 28.46%
* until third quarter of 2007.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: Number of Observations,
Mean, Standard Deviation, Median, 5%, 25%,
75% and 95% Percentiles for cutoffs 40 days and
3 months
IPOs with an offer price below $5.00 per share, financial firms (SIC code between 6000 and 6999),
REITS, ADRs are excluded. Moreover, we exclude firms without financial information on Compu-
stat North America between 21 and 111 days before the IPO. Panel A reports summary statistics
for firms with a 13f Institutional Ownership Report within 40 days of the IPO date. Panel B re-
ports summary statistics for firms with a 13f Institutional Ownership Report with 3 months of the
IPO date. Partial Adjustment is defined as the percentage increase of decrease of the offer price
relative to the original middle of file range. Venture Backing is a dummy variable which equals 1
when the firm had a venture capitalist among shareholders before the IPO, and 0 otherwise. Share
Overhang is the ratio of Shares Outstanding after the IPO to Primary Shares offered in the IPO.
The proceeds raised amount is represented in millions of dollars.
# Obs. Mean σ 5th % 25th % Median 75th % 95th %
Panel A: 40 Days Cuttoff
Institutional Ownership 1013 0.21 0.17 0.03 0.10 0.17 0.27 0.57
Rank 1013 8.06 1.50 5.10 8.10 8.60 9.10 9.10
Proceeds Raised 1013 101.85 340.80 10.60 27.50 45.50 84.00 285.60
Partial Adjustment 1011 0.05 0.27 –0.30 –0.09 0.00 0.14 0.50
Venture Backing 1013 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Age 972 16.27 21.22 1.00 4.00 8.00 18.00 72.00
No. of Bookrunners 1013 1.05 0.22 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Share Overhang 845 10.92 115.53 1.63 3.19 4.24 6.25 16.00
Total Assets 1013 318.14 1929.37 5.69 18.08 39.26 143.73 979.00
Debt to Equity Ratio 1013 4.52 101.68 –5.94 0.37 1.27 3.25 13.41
WC over Assets 989 0.19 0.60 –0.27 0.04 0.20 0.43 0.71
Sales over Assets 1008 0.40 0.43 0.02 0.16 0.34 0.53 0.91
Liabilities over Assets 1012 0.71 0.63 0.16 0.41 0.66 0.85 1.33
Price Earnings Ratio 969 36.06 240.62 –216.67 –21.74 30.36 82.14 325.00
Panel B: 3 Months Cuttoff
Institutional Ownership 3037 0.23 0.17 0.04 0.11 0.19 0.29 0.58
Rank 3037 7.97 1.58 5.00 8.00 8.10 9.10 9.10
Proceeds Raised 3037 92.50 296.98 8.50 23.90 41.30 77.10 271.60
Partial Adjustment 3028 0.04 0.30 –0.30 –0.10 0.00 0.13 0.44
Venture Backing 3037 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Age 2917 16.06 21.07 1.00 4.00 8.00 17.00 69.00
No. of Bookrunners 3037 1.04 0.22 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Share Overhang 2556 8.12 70.59 1.68 3.18 4.24 6.00 13.91
Total Assets 3037 278.08 1470.99 4.51 16.06 35.88 116.53 894.78
Debt to Equity Ratio 3036 4.35 200.87 –7.16 0.38 1.31 3.32 14.24
WC over Assets 2965 0.18 0.55 –0.33 0.03 0.20 0.41 0.71
Sales over Assets 3025 0.41 0.52 0.01 0.16 0.35 0.54 0.95
Liabilities over Assets 3035 0.71 0.58 0.16 0.43 0.67 0.87 1.31
Price Earnings Ratio 2910 43.17 257.57 –183.33 –20.59 27.62 83.33 350.00
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Table 2.3: Regressions of Percentage Institutional Allocation
on Several Variables for two different cutoffs
The dependent variable in all regressions is the institutional investors’ holding of the stock as a
percentage of the total shares outstanding (from 0 to 100). This information is collected in the
SEC Form 13f filed no later than 40 days or 3 months after the IPO date. All the variables con-
sidered in the regressions were publicly available before the IPO. Regression (1) considers only
variables related to the offer characteristics for the 40 days cutoff. Regression (2) adds to the
analysis variables calculated from financial report for the 40 days cutoff. Regression (3) and (4)
repeats the same previous analysis, but the cutoff is changed to 3 months. t-statistics are reported
in parentheses.
40 Days Cuttoff 3 Months Cuttoff
OLS(1) OLS(2) OLS(3) OLS(4)
Rank 2.04*** 2.16*** 1.84*** 1.86***
(0.42) (0.44) (0.23) (0.24)
Proceeds Raised 3.98** 3.77** 7.18*** 6.30***
(1.76) (1.75) (1.27) (1.34)
Partial Adjustment –4.68** –5.44** –3.13** –3.40***
(2.20) (2.19) (1.28) (1.28)
Venture Backing –2.54** –1.70 –0.39 –0.24
(1.23) (1.28) (0.70) (0.72)
Age 0.04 0.03 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Share Overhang –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Debt to Equity Ratio –1.38 0.00
(2.15) (0.00)
Working Capital to Assets Ratio –1.37 –0.84
(2.15) (1.13)
Sales over Assets –0.60 –0.66
(1.81) (0.64)
Liabilities over Assets 3.70** 1.39
(1.82) (1.03)
Price Earnings Ratio 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Number of Observations 812 761 2457 2315
Adjusted R squared 0.047 0.060 0.053 0.054
F - Test for Financial Variables 2.99** 2.4**
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics: Number of Observations,
Mean, Standard Deviation, Median, 5%, 25%,
75% and 95% Percentiles, Minimum and Maxi-
mum for 1 year and 2 years after the IPO
IPOs with an offer price below $5.00 per share, financial firms (SIC code between 6000 and 6999),
REITS, ADRs are excluded. Moreover, we exclude firms without financial information on Com-
pustat North America between 21 and 111 days before the IPO and firms with the first report on
Institutional Ownership more than 40 days from the IPO date. Panel A presents the summary
statistics for the IPOs that have quarterly financial reports on Compustat North America and
ownership reports on Thompson Financial 13f Database 1 year after the IPO. Panel B presents
the summary statistics for the IPOs that have quarterly financial reports on Compustat North
America and ownership reports on Thompson Financial 13f Database 2 years after the IPO.
Please refer to the description in Table 2.2 for the definition of each variable used in this table.
# Obs. Mean σ 5th % 25th % Median 75th % 95th %
Panel A: 1 year after IPO
Institutional Ownership 958 0.34 0.24 0.04 0.15 0.30 0.47 0.81
Rank 958 8.08 1.46 5.10 8.10 8.60 9.10 9.10
Proceeds Raised 958 102.83 349.70 10.60 27.00 45.00 84.00 288.00
Partial Adjustment 956 0.04 0.26 –0.30 –0.09 0.00 0.13 0.50
Venture Backing 958 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Age 921 16.52 21.38 1.00 4.00 8.00 18.00 72.00
No. of Bookrunners 958 1.05 0.23 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00
Share Overhang 794 11.30 119.17 1.63 3.18 4.28 6.25 17.76
Total Assets 953 475.19 2245.89 23.36 53.29 110.81 301.70 1561.85
Debt to Equity Ratio 953 9.24 289.50 0.05 0.21 0.46 1.26 4.60
WC over Assets 931 0.39 0.27 –0.01 0.18 0.39 0.62 0.84
Sales over Assets 952 0.26 0.21 0.02 0.11 0.23 0.36 0.65
Liabilities over Assets 953 0.40 0.27 0.06 0.19 0.33 0.57 0.87
Price Earnings Ratio 947 63.35 302.72 –183.59 –14.56 46.32 101.43 295.31
Panel B: 2 years after IPO
Institutional Ownership 852 0.38 0.26 0.04 0.16 0.32 0.57 0.89
Rank 852 8.10 1.43 5.10 8.10 8.60 9.10 9.10
Proceeds Raised 852 105.13 368.43 10.60 27.00 44.90 84.00 288.00
Partial Adjustment 850 0.04 0.26 –0.30 –0.09 0.00 0.13 0.50
Venture Backing 852 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Age 815 16.65 21.41 1.00 4.00 8.00 19.00 72.00
No. of Bookrunners 852 1.05 0.22 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Share Overhang 696 12.24 127.27 1.71 3.22 4.31 6.42 21.41
Total Assets 846 506.94 2395.52 20.42 61.39 138.33 370.25 1644.34
Debt to Equity Ratio 846 1.57 7.18 0.06 0.24 0.54 1.43 5.32
WC over Assets 829 0.34 0.29 –0.08 0.13 0.34 0.57 0.80
Sales over Assets 846 0.26 0.20 0.03 0.12 0.22 0.36 0.64
Liabilities over Assets 846 0.44 0.29 0.08 0.21 0.38 0.61 0.92
Price Earnings Ratio 839 39.49 345.20 –162.50 –15.23 39.02 92.00 311.87
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Table 2.5: Regressions of Percentage Institutional Allocation
on Several Variables for the IPO moment and 1
year or 2 years after the IPO date
The dependent variable in all regressions is the institutional investors’ holdings of the stock as a
percentage of the total shares outstanding (from 0 to 100). Regressions (1) and (2) use the same
sample of issuers. The same happens with Regressions (3) and (4). Regressions (1) and (3) use
the IPO characteristics plus the most recent financial report variables before the IPO and the first
report on institutional investors holdings no later than 40 days after the IPO. Regression (2) uses
the IPO characteristics, institutional investors’ holdings reported 1 year after the IPO plus the
most recent financial report variables disclosed before that institutional report 1 year after the
IPO date. Regression (4) uses the IPO characteristics, institutional investors holdings reported
2 years after the IPO date plus the most recent financial report variables disclosed before that
institutional report 2 years after the IPO date. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
1 year analysis 2 years analysis
OLS(1) OLS(2) OLS(3) OLS(4)
Rank 1.94*** 3.06*** 1.91*** 3.88***
(0.42) (0.57) (0.46) (0.69)
Proceeds Raised 0.32* 6.88*** 3.18* 5.14**
(1.67) (2.18) (1.68) (2.55)
Partial Adjustment –4.50** 1.81 –4.73** –2.04
(2.10) (2.97) (2.24) (3.58)
Venture Backing –1.95 5.72*** –2.11* 6.65***
(1.20) (1.66) (1.26) (1.95)
Age 0.04 0.13*** 0.04 0.18***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Debt to Equity Ratio 0.01 –0.00 0.01 0.25*
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.14)
Working Capital to Assets Ratio 2.56 –3.16 2.88 3.41
(1.79) (3.58) (1.98) (4.22)
Sales over Assets 0.11 3.58 0.72 6.58
(1.74) (3.81) (1.95) (4.74)
Liabilities over Assets 3.96** 1.29 3.98** –4.77
(1.67) (3.78) (1.91) (4.37)
Price Earnings Ratio 0.00 0.00 –0.00 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of Observations 862 862 767 767
Adjusted R squared 0.045 0.081 0.043 0.086
F - Test for Financial Variables 1.84 1.29 1.44 2.30**
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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